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Abstract 
  
The ways in which voters in democratic societies receive the information from which 
they base their political decision making has evolved along with technology.  As radio 
accompanied print media in the 1920s, so too has television and the new media of the 
internet age.  As the abundance and ubiquity of news media has increased, 
correspondingly has the informative role of media in the democratic process.  The 
agenda setting theory of mass media has long proven that the issues highlighted in the 
media’s agenda are subsequently highlighted in the public agenda and shape political 
debate.  Additionally, framing theory suggests that the way the media describes an issue 
influences public perception of that issue.  Recent concerns over “fake news,” 
information warfare, and hostile narratives have pushed the issue of media content to 
the forefront of debate balancing democratic threats with the freedom of expression. 
 
Provided the importance of media content, this research set out to determine what 
influences the construction of agendas and frames, and specifically, given the 
emergence and proliferation of what I have termed “expeditionary” media 
organizations, that is media organizations funded by a government for production and 
consumption in a foreign market, what affect funding model has on content production.  
To determine this, the coverage of three British media organizations with varying 
funding models: Sky News, a typical commercial news organization; the BBC, a public 
service broadcaster; and RT UK, a Russian state funded expeditionary media 
organization, were analyzed over the course of the UK’s referendum campaign 
regarding EU membership.  For three distinct one-week periods, February 21-27, April 
17-23, and June 19-25, 2016, all of the campaign coverage from the native websites of 
 
 
all three organizations was analyzed and coded to determine which issues comprised the 
greatest proportion of the agenda.  Additionally, each issue was analyzed for tone to 
determine how various issues were framed.  
 
Utilizing this data I was able to determine that the core agenda of all three media 
organizations consisted of the same eight issues: economy, horserace, coalition 
building, migration, sovereignty, EU reform, trade, and security.  Only those issues 
comprising less than 3% of coverage saw much difference depending upon funding 
model.  This lesser agenda does nonetheless suggest some influence by the various 
funding models.  Frame building, however, exhibited a strong diversity between the 
three organizations.  There was no discernable pattern of individual issues similarly 
framed by all three organizations.  The BBC’s coverage remained relatively neutral, 
with a small range of tone, while Sky News created content that was slightly negative, 
with a much larger range of tone, and RT UK’s coverage was very negative with the 
greatest range of tone, suggesting that the funding model plays an important role in how 
issues are portrayed in the media. 
 
These results suggest that different funding models may not have much influence on 
which issues the media highlights, but it does have a strong influence on how the media 
presents those issues.  This could be important to future media regulators and legislators 
in order to develop policy that promotes a quality pluralistic media environment, to 
consider the funding model of various media organizations in addition to ownership.  
Additionally, this research demonstrates that the social environment where the content 
is produced is very influential on agenda building.  This opens the door to determine 
how different expeditionary media organizations construct agendas and frames, whether 
content funded by the same government, but produced in different target markets shows 
any commonality, and whether expeditionary media content shares any similarity with 
content produced in the organization’s funding country. 
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Introduction 
 
The news media plays a key role in liberal democratic societies. It has long been 
argued that the Fourth Estate is responsible for facilitating the political discourse 
necessary for citizens to engage meaningfully with their government (Esipisu & 
Khaguli, 2009). In today’s societies, voters heavily rely on the news media for the 
information needed to make political decisions and subsequently vote. Free and fair 
elections would be considerably more difficult without the information provided by the 
media.  News media also serve as watchdogs, fostering trust among voters and political 
elites by holding those elites accountable (Chan & Suen 2009).   
While the informative role of media has existed for years, the dissemination and 
consumption of news media has changed dramatically since the advent of the internet 
age.  In the 1990s researchers postulated the “CNN effect” while attempting to 
determine the importance of 24-hour news broadcasts on foreign policy (Gilboa, 2005); 
after the explosion of social media came the “al Jazeera effect,” which attempted to 
explain the importance of new media such as Facebook and Twitter on geopolitics 
(Seib, 2012). Given the ease of access to media in the internet era, as well as the 
influence of news media on public opinion, it is unsurprising that in the era of 24/7 
news coverage nation states would invest in their own media outlets to be disseminated 
in foreign markets.  By 2017 the amalgam of these state-financed media outlets 
broadcasting in foreign media systems include: the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) World Service, funded by the British government; Deutsche Welle, funded by 
the German government; RT, funded by the Russian government; France24, which 
began as a public-private partnership between the French government’s holding 
company, France Medias Monde, and the private media company, Groupe TF1, but was 
wholly owned by France Medias Monde as of 2008; NHK World, the broadcaster of the 
Japanese government; CCTV, the Chinese state broadcaster; Al Jazeera, funded by the 
Qatari royal family; TRT, the public broadcaster of the state of Turkey; and others.  
These new types of media organizations which are funded by states, and are not 
intended for domestic audiences, but instead are exported to foreign markets, are 
relative newcomers to the global media stage, and as such there is no term for exactly 
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what these organizations are.  For the sake of clarity throughout this study, I refer to 
these types of content producers as “expeditionary” media organizations. 
Since its inception in 2005, the Russian State-funded news broadcaster RT has 
expanded into English speaking markets.  In 2014, RT launched a dedicated British 
channel in London called RT UK, which some estimates believe has become the third 
most widely viewed 24-hour news channel in the United Kingdom (UK) (Pomerantsev, 
2015). Many Russian foreign policy scholars note this as a deliberate policy move by 
the Russian government (Giles, 2016; Thornton, 2015). Western leaders have taken a 
concerned view of Russian media, going so far as to develop numerous entities, such as 
NATO’s Strategic Communication Center of Excellence, and the EU’s Strategic 
Communication Task Force within the European External Action Service, in part to 
discredit the Russian narrative produced by RT. However, there is little agreement on 
what effect Russian media sources such as RT and Sputnik have on English-speaking 
audiences. While some Russian foreign policy experts argue that these media sources 
serve to propagate the Russian view of events, others argue that these outlets are 
designed to create so much informational “noise” that audiences are unable to discern 
objective reporting from more subjective reporting or even outright disinformation 
(Giles, 2016).  Perhaps the most visible accusation levied against RT from western 
governments, came from the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in 
the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election.  The unclassified DNI report, 
“Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections” attempted to 
elucidate the role of the Russian state in the 2016 US presidential election.  This report 
concluded that RT served as a prominent platform for Kremlin messaging, referencing 
RT in over half of the report, citing the close collaboration between RT and WikiLeaks, 
and the biased coverage of the two candidates, which described Donald Trump as a 
victim of unfair coverage, while describing Hillary Clinton as having poor health and 
close ties to Islamic extremism (2017).   
RT is also often the subject of stories by other media organizations.  In this 
context, various branches of RT are regularly reported as being Russian propaganda, or 
a tool of the Russian President Vladimir Putin.  According to NBC news in the US, “the 
U.S. considers RT, which is state-sponsored, to be a propaganda outlet.” (Dilanian & 
Hunt, 2017).  In its January 2017 issue, The Economist described RT as “the Kremlin-
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financed media weapon.”  In March 2017 The New York Times published a story aimed 
at describing the news organization, including repeated assertions from management in 
RT that it was just another international news organization, while also stating that some 
believe “RT and Sputnik are simply tools of a sophisticated Russian propaganda 
machine, created by the Kremlin to push its foreign policy, defend its aggression in 
Ukraine and undermine confidence in democracy, NATO and the world as we have 
known it.” (Erlanger, 2017).  The coverage of RT in popular media often connects 
Russian state operational funding with the organization serving as a mouthpiece of 
propaganda.   
For all the concerns about RT’s content, there is little that media regulators can 
do to mediate its messaging.  Regardless of the direct operational funding RT receives, 
and the opaque government ties, on paper most of RT’s bureaus are under the 
managerial control of independent non-governmental organizations.  RT’s structure and 
ostensible independence provide a strong protection from the organization’s critics. 
Despite the concerns from western governments, and discussions in popular 
media, the content of RT’s reporting has been the subject of very little academic 
investigations (Yablokov, 2015).  Additionally, given the huge investment from the 
Russian government into this media outlet, little research has been conducted to 
understand what type of media actor RT is.  RT is often either lumped together with 
commercial news media producers as just another international news producer or 
decried as propaganda.  This thesis began with that general research aim in mind; given 
the accusations by many that RT was propaganda, despite the assertions from within 
that the organization was just another international news producer, and the prevalence 
of RT in foreign markets, I aim to better understand how RT’s content compared to 
other media organizations.  Given that the primary differences between RT and other 
news producers is the source of funding, I want to discover how different funding 
models influences the news production process of a media organization.   
The differences in news media content are particularly critical in the field of 
political communications.  Political communications regard how politicians transmit 
their political messages (Foster, 2010). In the field of political communication, much of 
the research on media today differentiates between broad types of media; newsprint, 
television broadcasts, radio broadcasts, and the new media of the internet age.  Yet, little 
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differentiation has been made within each category.  This is somewhat problematic as 
the definite lines separating broad media types are blurring with the ease of content 
producer to incorporate different mediums through the internet.  For example, The New 
York Times, a prominent American broadsheet newspaper, has an active YouTube 
channel where self-produced news videos are available.  Additionally, many traditional 
television news outlets, such as CNN, Al Jazeera, and BBC News, now publish written 
news stories on their websites.  That being said, the literature regarding broadcast news 
organizations has a well-developed differentiation between public service broadcasters, 
that is, broadcasters, usually owned and operated by domestic governments, to provide 
their public with unbiased, quality information in order to become more civically aware 
and subsequently better participants in the democratic process (Hendy, 2013), and 
commercial broadcasters, which are privately owned and are primarily concerned with 
generating profit (Newton, 2016), the fundamental difference between the two being 
operational funding. 
This research relies on the political communication theories of agenda setting, 
framing and the hierarchy of influences theory.  Considerable work has been conducted 
demonstrating that the issues highlighted in the media’s agenda are repeated in the 
public agenda.  This is best summed up with Bernard Cohen’s (1963) thesis that the 
press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (p.13).  In addition to 
this, there is substantial literature regarding the importance of how issues are reported in 
the news media, known as “framing.”  The work on framing theory has demonstrated 
that the descriptions of issues used by the media influence how the public thinks about 
the same issues (Chong & Druckman, 2007).  Since the content of the news media’s 
message is important in influencing public opinion, later research attempted to 
understand what influences news media organizations to produce the content that they 
ultimately publish.  This research was used in the construction of Shoemaker & Reese’s 
hierarchy of influences theory, which states that media content is influenced by a range 
of variables from the routines of individual journalists, to the society in which the 
content is produced in (2014) and included among this theory’s enumerated levels of 
analysis is the organization in which the content is produced.  
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The British referendum to leave the European Union (EU), commonly referred 
to as Brexit, is an ideal campaign through which to understand media effects because of 
the nature of referendum campaigns.  Referendum campaigns are rarely based on a 
single issue, but instead are the result of myriad different policies and positions (Vreese 
& Semetko, 2004).  This is clearly the case in the Brexit referendum with policies as 
diverse as immigration, public health, foreign policy, education, as well as many others 
all contributing to the referendum debate.  Furthermore, referendum campaigns offer a 
unique opportunity to study political communication because there is no unified 
message coming from political actors.  Unlike a traditional campaign, there are rarely 
clear partisan politics involved in referendum campaigns, and certainly not the same 
party hierarchies and candidates which can produce a coherent political message, as 
abundantly evident in the Brexit campaign which had over 40 recognized remain 
groups, and 8 different leave groups.  With no unified message coming from the 
political elite, and so many diverse issues reduced to a simple yes/no vote, media effects 
are amplified in referendum campaigns and have considerable autonomy in constructing 
the agenda and how those issues are framed in the campaign.  
Even in an increasingly globalized world, the nation state is still the primary 
structure in studying political communication. In addition to providing a valuable 
natural experiment through the Brexit campaign, the media system of the UK offers a 
notable context for comparative study. The UK is perhaps the architype of the public 
service core style of media system, with a quality and trusted national news producer in 
the BBC.  Despite the dominance of the BBC, the UK was one of the earliest European 
nations to allow private, commercial broadcasters (Curran, Iyengar, Brink Lund, & 
Salovaara-Moring, 2009). This being the case, the UK media system provides a quality 
location to study media effects as it has a well-developed, and well-researched system 
of both public service and commercial broadcasters with which to compare RT UK’s 
content. 
This environment offers a unique opportunity in which to examine how different 
funding models influence the content of various media outlets.  Specifically, whether 
Russian state funding influences the content of RT UK’s reporting of the Brexit 
campaign as compared to the BBC’s public service broadcasting model, with funding 
originating from the viewers themselves through the payment of license fees, and Sky 
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News’s corporate model, with funding coming from the profits earned by the 
organization.  Using the Brexit campaign as the context offers valuable insight into RT 
UK as a media actor, given the unique situation of having a referendum campaign with 
profound implications in a country with a strong and well-researched history of both 
public service and commercial broadcasting with which to compare. This led me to the 
specific research question: “Do different funding models influence agenda building and 
frame building in different news organizations?” 
To determine if the organizational variable of funding models influenced agenda 
building and frame building, I undertook quantitative and qualitative content analysis of 
all stories produced by the three media organizations; The BBC, Sky News, and RT 
UK, throughout three distinct one-week periods during the Brexit campaign.  The 
content was analyzed to determine which issues were given the most salience by each 
organization, and the tone associated with each issue by the various organizations.  
Using this data I was able to determine that while the exact emphasis placed on issues 
varied among the organizations, the same eight issues were central to agenda building of 
all three organizations.  Frame building, however varied considerably between the three 
organizations, leading me to conclude that funding models have a strong influence on 
frame building, while agenda building is likely to be more strongly influenced by higher 
order variables. 
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Background 
 
Political communication is inherently an interdisciplinary study bringing 
together the fields of political science, communication studies, sociology, 
journalism, psychology, and others. As such it has eluded any easy definition, with 
researchers from each facet of political communication projecting their own 
nuanced understandings on the field.  At the core of political communication is 
Lasswell’s model of communication, “Who says what in which channel to whom, 
with what effect?” (1948), provided the message is political.  For many 
contemporary critics of Lasswell’s model, these early understandings of political 
communication were very unidirectional; focused on a top down understanding of 
political messaging, with political actors formulating a message which would then 
be communicated to the professional media who would interpret this message and 
distribute it to the public, as modeled in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Traditional Model of Political Communication 
 
 A more contemporary understanding of political communication research includes 
more dialogue, and at every level.  A definition that is widely accepted comes from 
Pippa Norris (2004, p. 1).  
Political communications is an interactive process concerning the transmission of 
information among politicians, the news media and the public. The process 
operates down-wards from governing institutions towards citizens, horizontally in 
Political Actors 
Media 
Public 
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linkages among political actors, and also upwards from public opinion towards 
authorities. 
 
This is essentially something more akin to Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Contemporary Model of Political Communication 
 
Norris continues to describe political communication literature as falling into three 
distinct categories, often depending upon where in this communicative hierarchy they 
reside: production, contents, and effects. Production process literature looks at the top of 
the hierarchy and focuses on how political messages are produced by political actors 
such as politicians, political parties, interest groups, etc., and often focuses on the rise of 
professional political communication consultants (Scammel, 2016; Moloney, Richards, 
Scullion & Daymon, 2003). Political communication content literature aims to 
understand contents of the messages produced; this research usually focuses on the 
central pillar of the hierarchy and looks at the substance of the message, such as the tone 
and volume of reporting from a given source. Media effects literature is the largest body 
of work in political communications research (Semetko & Scammell 2012) and aims to 
understand how individuals are influenced by political communications. Since media 
production literature focuses on the actions of the political class it is outside of the 
scope of this thesis, not to mention that the type of message production in referendum 
campaigns is not the same as exists in other political communications. However, 
literature regarding political communication contents and media effects is paramount in 
Politicians 
Media 
Public 
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understanding possible organizational variables influencing the coverage of the Brexit 
referendum. 
 
Media Effects 
People have been conceptualizing the effects of mass media on the public since the 
early twentieth century.  One only needs to look at Orson Welles’ “War of the Worlds” 
broadcast in order to see how public interest can be shaped by media.  The ideas behind 
media manipulation have changed and grown along with the methods that we use to 
consume media.  Regardless of how it is packaged, it is difficult to deny that media 
consumption influences the public, and it has also been difficult to describe exactly how 
we are affected.  
The first significant academic research into mass media effects came from studying 
propaganda from the first World War.  Important among the early academic writing on 
propaganda was Harold Lasswell’s 1927 work, The Theory of Political Propaganda. 
Lasswell emphasized the alteration of collective attitudes, and was particularly adamant 
that propaganda was categorically different from education, specifically regarding its 
result.  Education, as Laswell understood it, utilized the scientific method and was open 
to whatever results an academic endeavor arrived at; propaganda, however, was only 
concerned with a specific result and therefore would manipulate the process to get the 
desired result.  Of particular interest to a contemporary reader of Lasswell’s work are 
his claims that the public of the early twentieth century were becoming more susceptible 
to propaganda because rapid technological change was responsible for increased social 
disorganization, a claim that feels at home in contemporary “New Media” research. 
Possibly the most influential event on the progression of research on media effects 
was the Lippmann-Dewy debate which also arose in the early twentieth century.  Walter 
Lippmann, in his 1922 book, Public Opinion, argued that the public is only capable of 
synthesizing information very superficially, and additionally are not capable of 
behaving rationally.  Lippmann argued that given an individual’s limited life experience 
in the broader picture of world affairs, the public relies entirely on mass media to 
explain the complexities of the world.  Lippmann further argued that the messaging of 
mass media is inherently flawed by the limitations of communication and concluded 
that because of this, citizens were unable to contribute meaningfully to democracies.  
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Lippmann ultimately concluded that democracy is simply untenable and that the public 
needs the control of an enlightened elite (Diggs-Brown, 2011).  
John Dewey engaged in debate with Lippmann, beginning with the publishing of 
his own book entitled The Public and Its Problems in 1927. Dewey countered 
Lippmann’s argument, claiming that while the public’s understanding of political 
communications was inelegant, they were ultimately capable of understanding and 
subsequently making informed decisions.  Dewey claimed that more resources were 
required in order to foster conditions to improve open debate in society.  Once open and 
transparent debate existed throughout a society, Dewey argued, societies would 
naturally come to and implement the best possible policies for their own development.  
In his 1938 work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey builds on his ideas of mass 
media, stating that only logic and strict adherence to the scientific method and reasoning 
should be used by the media in addressing policy and social concerns.  
Throughout the Second World War research on media effects was again consumed 
by interest in propaganda. In 1948, Leonard Doob, a former propagandist himself, 
published his work, Public Opinion and Propaganda.  Doob’s work was some of the 
earliest to incorporate psychology into the study of propaganda. He differentiates 
between different types of media: print, radio, and motion pictures, arguing that the 
modes of communication selected impacted public comprehension.  Most importantly, 
Doob’s influential work demonstrated a mechanism, in the form of stimulus-response, 
for the ability of mass media to shape public opinion.  
Doob’s work paved the way for the next generation of studies on mass media 
effects, marked by the belief that mass media is all-powerful in shaping public 
understanding. This generation of understanding is best exemplified by the “magic 
bullet” or “hypodermic needle” theory, which postulates that all humans are driven by 
base psychological desires and mass media can easily manipulate public opinion by 
simply targeting these base needs or desires.  This idea does not seem to be attributable 
to any individual nor based on any empirical research, and instead relied on 
observations regarding Nazi propaganda (Moy & Bosch, 2013).  After being universally 
disproved, most researchers appear to have distanced themselves from any mention of 
the magic bullet theory. 
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As early as the late 1940’s, researchers were discovering more theoretically- and 
methodologically-sound models of mass media effects. Chief among these researchers 
was Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia University. Lazarsfeld’s work heavily contributed to 
the “two-step flow” theory of communication (Katz & Lazersfeld, 1955).  This work 
proposed that the public as an entity was not as susceptible to media effects as 
previously believed.  Instead, Lazarsfeld suggested that individuals are more heavily 
influenced by important public figures who he termed opinion leaders.  Lazarsfeld’s 
“Two-step flow” was further developed in his seminal work, Personal Influence, which 
demonstrated that consumers were more likely to be persuaded to purchase a good 
based on personal recommendation than on advertisements alone (Simonson, 2006).  
Media was therefore shown to influence individuals by influencing these opinion 
leaders that the people looked to. 
Another important researcher at this time who collaborated with Paul Lazarsfeld 
was Bernard Berelson.  Berelson’s important contribution to this field was his 1954 
work, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign.  Berelson 
studied the 1948 presidential election in Elmira, New York in the United Staes and 
concluded that not only were individuals influenced by opinion makers, but their social 
system heavily influenced which opinion makers they were more influenced by.  
Berelson’s important contribution to political communication research more broadly 
was demonstrating the importance of sociology on the field, and along with Lazarsfeld 
demonstrated that media effects were much more complicated than previously believed 
and contingent upon a multitude of variables.  
The next major breakthrough in our understanding of media effects arose from 
McCombs and Shaw’s 1972 work, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.  In this 
study the authors determined that in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, voters considered 
those issues that were most widely covered by the press to be the most important issues 
in the campaign.  McCombs and Shaw’s theory has been repeatedly tested (Gans, 1979; 
Shoemaker & Reese, 1996) and has, to date, not been fundamentally challenged.  
Agenda setting is among the most widely published on aspect of media effects research, 
and has matured to include ideas on content placement in media presentation as well as 
repetition of content (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). The most contemporary research 
on agenda setting attempts to understand the agenda setting of new media, which 
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includes online media, social media, and other digital communications (Boynton & 
Richardson, 2016).  
Demonstrating the interdisciplinary nature of political communication research, the 
next major breakthroughs in media effects literature came from advancements in the 
study of cognitive psychology.  In the early 1990’s, researchers determined that people 
are more likely to utilize recently encountered ideas than more temporally distantly 
encountered ideas (Tulving & Schacter, 1990).  Media researchers were quick to apply 
this new discovery, which they dubbed “priming” in the field of political 
communications.  The basic premise of priming research contends that when a media 
actor presents a topic, that topic is brought to the forefront of an individual’s cognition 
and will be more readily recalled and utilized in decision making (Hastie & Park, 1986).  
Since most of the public is not keenly aware of every issue in a political contest, the 
media can highlight those issues upon which political decisions will be made. 
The final influential concept in this field, which also originated in psychology, is 
framing. According to Robert Entman in his 1993 work, Framing: Toward Clarification 
of a Fractured Paradigm, frames highlight the most salient pieces of information in a 
message.  Unlike agenda setting and priming, framing operates from the assumption that 
the way in which a message is presented can have an effect on the audience.  Mass 
media is able to accentuate which aspects of a message are the most important, and 
thereby determine how their audience thinks about a given topic.  
The biggest issue in media effects research currently is the effect of widespread 
internet usage on political communications.  Numerous researchers are attempting to 
determine whether the theories developed in a time of newspapers and broadcast 
television are still valid in the internet era.  Much work is also currently underway to 
understand what influence social media has on media effects, specifically given the 
numerous personal blogs and outlets which have somewhat eroded the clear distinctions 
between political actors, the media, and the public that were conceptualized in a pre-
internet era and now give politicians direct lines to the public.   
 
Media Content  
 Given the immense interest in media effects research and proven influence that 
media content has on public opinion, it is surprising that fewer researchers have been 
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interested in how the news media is created. Media effects would not be possible 
without media content and, as such, the two are intrinsically tied.  While some anecdotal 
evidence exists of media content analysis by the Catholic Church as early as the 17th 
century, contemporary media content analysis traces its genesis to the early 20th century. 
Early media content studies originated in the United States concurrently with a marked 
increase in newsprint production; these analyses were themselves printed in editorial 
sections of newspapers and often attempted to understand the “Yellow Journalism” 
phenomenon of the time (Rodgers, 2007).  These studies relied on simple metrics such 
as measuring the block of text associated with a given story and lacked the academic 
rigor that would come later (Krippendorff, 2004). 
 The 1930s and 1940s saw the first major academic breakthroughs regarding the 
study of media content.  As public opinion research became more widespread, 
exemplified by Walter Lippmann’s Public Opinion, researchers began to compare 
media content and public opinion. Chief among these early researchers who brought 
actual academic merit to the study of media content was Julian Woodward, who in 1933 
published the first meaningful consideration of methodology regarding content analysis.  
Woodward regarded “securing of meaningful, and at the same time stable, categories of 
classification” (p.530) as the most important problem facing meaningful quantitative 
newspaper analysis, but also considered the development of a sampling technique and 
what quantitative unit to use when reporting findings. 
 Demonstrating the multidisciplinary nature of political communication studies, 
the next major advances in media content research arrived from the study of 
psychology. First, Allport and Faden’s 1940 publication, The Psychology of 
Newspapers: Five Tentative Laws, built upon psychological experiments in rumor 
dissemination to demonstrate how information changed as it was transmitted from a 
political actor through media institutions and to the citizen audience. Additional 
research of particular importance to the field of media content studies developed at this 
time in concert with the psychological concept of “attitude.”  “Attitude” is the positive 
or negative evaluation that individuals confer to any given object (Chisman, 1976).  
While utilizing the concept of “attitude,” Janis and Fadner published A coefficient of 
imbalance for content analysis (1943).  This publication gave media content researchers 
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a tool to understand and quantify bias in the media and led to improved journalistic 
standards. 
 In the late 1940’s Paul Lazarsfeld and Bernard Berelson coined the term 
“content analysis.” In their 1948 work The Analysis of Communication Content, the two 
authors concisely presented the methodology and concepts around the growing field of 
content analysis in communication studies. This work was later incorporated by 
Berelson in his book, Content Analysis in Communication Research (1952).  This was 
the first textbook on media content and added considerable legitimacy to the study of 
media content by consolidating all of the knowledge on media content analysis at the 
time and concisely conceptualizing content analysis as a methodology.  
 While the focus on content analysis did much to further the field of media 
content studies, simply quantifying the content of various news media did little to help 
understand why certain stories are published while others are not.  The first 
conceptualization of this type arose from German-American psychologist Kurt Lewin.  
Lewin (1947) developed gatekeeping as a model to explain how information is 
transmitted.  His research focused on food habits, in which he demonstrated that 
information on food selection moves stage by stage through channels and at each stage 
the information goes through a “gate,” where it either progresses to the next stage or is 
discarded based upon various psychological forces.  Lewin determined that various 
channels can lead to the same result and that different actors serve as “gatekeepers.”   
 Soon after publication, Lewin’s gatekeeping model was used in the context of 
news production.  David White (1950) first applied Lewin’s model to better understand 
a singular “gate” in the news production of a mid-sized American newspaper.  White 
studied the wire-editor, an individual responsible for determining which stories from 
several wire services would ultimately end up on the front page of the newspaper. White 
determined that gatekeeping was ultimately based upon highly subjective personal 
reasons stating, “through studying his overt reasons for rejecting news stories from the 
press associations we see how highly subjective, how based on the ‘gate keeper’s’ own 
set of experiences, attitudes and expectations the communication of ‘news’ really is” 
(p.390).   
 In the years since White’s study, gatekeeping theory has developed into a well-
established media content theory; however, just as with media effects research, the 
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advent of the internet has called into question many of the assumptions initially 
proposed in a world dominated by print media, television, and radio.  These “old media” 
relied on expensive infrastructure and institutions to convey information, limiting the 
avenues for dissemination of information.  The internet has greatly reduced the cost of 
message transmission and, as such, the volume of information has increased (Bastos, 
Raimundo, & Travitzki, 2013).  New media was thought to herald the end of 
gatekeeping, as the decreased production costs and increased availability were believed 
to end news media creators’ hegemony over media content.  However, recent research 
demonstrates that information is still moderated through gatekeepers; they have just 
taken a different form and their influence is less pronounced than in prior media 
environments (Schwalbe, Silcock, & Candello, 2015). 
 The advent of computers has also influenced the way in which media content 
studies are performed. Computers allowed content researchers to categorize 
considerably larger amounts of texts and to do it much more quickly.  The most 
influential early work on computerized content analysis was The General Inquirer: A 
Computer Approach to Content Analysis (Stone, Dunphy, & Smith, 1966).  This work 
laid out how computerized content analysis could be used across a variety of fields, 
including political science, psychology, and advertising.  Unlike previous advances in 
the field of media content studies, computerized content analysis did not change how 
media content was conceptualized; it simply added an improved methodology to 
existing theories. 
 Another important theoretical advancement in media content studies was the 
advent of critical discourse analysis (CDA).  Unlike traditional media content studies, 
CDA researchers draw on linguistic and social theory to determine the power relations 
in discourse.  Instead of simply attempting to determine how certain phenomena are 
represented, CDA has dealt heavily with power relations, which is of particular interest 
to political communication research (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000).  Most credit 
Norman Fairclough’s 1989 work Language and Power to be the genesis of CDA.   
 When faced with so few theories through which to understand media content 
production, Pamela Shoemaker and Stephen Reese set out to develop a better theoretical 
framework.  Their work culminated in the 1996 book Mediating the Message, wherein 
they compile the scattered studies, such as White’s gatekeeper study, into a larger 
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coherent understanding of which variables influence media content.  In this work they 
lay out the Hierarchy of Influences Model, which is rooted in social constructivism and 
describes five layers of influences on media content.  These layers, from micro to 
macro, are: individuals, routines, organizations, social institutions, and social systems.  
Shoemaker and Reese argue that no single layer is isolated and they all influence one 
another, as well as media content.  
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Theoretical Framework 
Agenda Setting Theory 
 The best way in which a democracy works as idealized is when all voting 
citizens interact with information about the candidates and issues about which they are 
voting (Milner, 2002).  Without an informed electorate casting votes in accordance with 
their own interests and values, representative democracies would only serve random 
chance, and not the interests of the public. In sufficiently small groups, the electorate 
might be able to receive all the information necessary to make a decision directly from 
individual political actors.  It is easy to imagine that in a mayoral election in a town of 
200 individuals, every voter would be able to receive enough information directly from 
the candidates themselves in order to make an informed decision.  However, there is 
certainly a limit to the amount of engagement that individual politicians or parties can 
have; it is difficult to imagine that a candidate running for the President of France would 
be able to personally communicate with every French voter. Since it would be 
seemingly impossible for every member of the electorate to personally engage with 
every politician running for office, voters are reliant on other sources for information on 
which to base their political decision making.  While social media is becoming an 
increasingly important source for political communication (Patrut, Patrut, & 
SpringerLink, 2014), the majority of voters still receive the information on which they 
base political decisions from traditional news media sources (European Commission, 
2015). 
 Since news media occupies such a prominent position in the democratic process, 
it is important to understand how news reports are constructed.  In a perfect democratic 
model, the news would produce unbiased and objective reports of political issues and 
the political elite from which public debate could ultimately determine the best possible 
outcomes (Clawson & Oxley, 2013). Many journalists would argue that this is exactly 
what they do, that they report objective truths, and since the 19th century, professional 
journalism has maintained that the theory of objectivity is essential to the field (Allan, 
2010). Despite this core tenant of professional journalism, it is not difficult to see the 
myriad interpretations surrounding any given phenomenon. Chan (2015) demonstrated 
in the case of the Umbrella Movement of Hong Kong that various media organizations 
produced increasingly different headlines including, “Tear gas fired as thousands join 
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Occupy,” “Fearless to suppression, 60,000 people occupied Central and called for Leug 
to step down,” and “Hong Kong Cries” (p. 423) to describe a singular phenomenon.  
Likewise, Schultz, Kleinnijenhuis, Oegema, Utz, & van Atteveldt (2012) showcased 
considerable discrepancies in coverage of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill between US 
and UK news media.  According to their study, US media reported on the role of the US 
president in 56% of newspaper coverage, while only 37% of British stories reported on 
the US presidency. In addition, the UK media reported on the exact cause of the spill in 
only 4% of its coverage, while the US media reported on the cause in 12% of its 
coverage (p. 102). Both cases demonstrate instances wherein various media actors were 
confronted with a single phenomenon, and ultimately produced varied news reports.  If 
all news reporters were simply conveying completely objective realities, there would be 
no discrepancies in reports.  This reveals a fundamental concept in agenda-setting 
theory; in order to convey information about a complex and multifaceted issue, media 
actors must decide which aspects of the issue to highlight and communicate and, in 
doing so, construct reality regarding that issue.  While these different interpretations 
may be all based on objective observations of the exact same events, diverse journalists 
create discrete realities by reaching different conclusions. 
 Given the public’s reliance on the news media for information regarding 
political decisions, and the understanding that news media organizations create realities 
through their reporting, it is easy to conclude that the media is essentially omnipotent in 
its ability to influence public opinion.  However, this is clearly not the case as the magic 
bullet theory has been disproved time and again (see: Baines, et al, 2010; Neuman, & 
Guggenheim, 2011; Robertson, 2014).  An individual is inherently limited in their 
interactions with the world, as no single person can experience everything, however, 
this does not mean that individuals do not rely on any personal experience when 
forming opinions from media observations (Soroka, Maioni, & Martin, 2013).  An 
analogy to Plato’s allegory of the cave in his work Republic is often used to better 
understand this concept.  Plato proposes that individuals have been imprisoned from 
birth in a cave with their necks chained such that they can only see the surface of the 
cave in front of themselves.  Behind the prisoners is a wall, and behind the wall a fire is 
burning.  From their position, the prisoners are unable to see any object moving behind 
them, only the shadow of objects as they are projected onto the cave’s surface in front 
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of them. When the prisoners only see shadows, they perceive these shadows as the 
entire reality, as they are unable to perceive the physical items that are casting the 
shadows and are therefore limited in their understanding of their world.  When the 
prisoners are subsequently unchained and able to move their heads, they are able to 
perceive a new reality wherein the shadows are simply an aspect of a much more 
complex object (Plato & Halliwell, 1993).  So, the analogy as such, is that the public is 
constrained by their limited life experience and cannot fully understand the political 
realities of the political elites.  Certainly, they have some understanding of political 
decisions, as they can see the tangible results of those decisions in their daily lives.  
However, not every policy decision will directly influence every single citizen’s life, 
and so the public would largely remain ignorant of most political actions.  The news 
media therefore often serves to describe those phenomena to the public through their 
own constructed realities.  In consuming these reports, the public is forced to compare 
the media’s constructed reality to their existing understanding of phenomena.  To 
understand those gaps in their knowledge, people seek out information and then 
compare that information with their already existing understandings (Norris, 2012).   
 Those assumptions led to the beginning of the agenda-setting theory of mass 
media.  Early research in agenda-setting aimed to describe the news media’s ability to 
influence the salience placed on issues by the public (McCombs and Reynolds, 2002). 
Agenda setting was first hypothesized by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw’s 
landmark 1972 work The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.  McCombs and 
Shaw demonstrated that five issues: foreign policy, law and order, fiscal policy, public 
welfare, and civil rights, dominated the media agenda in Chapel Hill, North Carolina in 
the United States during the 1968 presidential campaign (p. 179).  The authors went on 
to demonstrate a nearly perfect correlation between the importance placed on each issue 
by undecided Chapel Hill voters and the amount of coverage of each issue, as well as 
the prominence of each issue in the news media (p. 180-181).  Simply stated, the more 
an issue was reported on and the more prominent the location of an issue within the 
medium (i.e. whether an issue occupies a front-page headline of a newspaper, or is only 
present in the text farther removed) the more important it was determined to be by 
voters in deciding which candidate to vote for.  McCombs and Shaw’s initial study also 
demonstrated the different salience placed on each of the five issues by different news 
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sources.  Comparing the analyzed content of nine news media sources, the researchers 
demonstrated correlated coverage as low as 42% (p. 183), giving credence to the 
assumption that broadcasters shape political reality instead of simply presenting a single 
external reality.   
 McCombs and Shaw’s early research seemed to prove Bernard Cohen’s (1963) 
thesis that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to 
think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (p.13) and 
proved that the media agenda shapes the public agenda.  The salience placed on objects 
by the media is subsequently repeated in the same proportion by the public. Since 
McCombs and Shaw’s initial study into agenda setting, the theory has matured and 
developed considerably, though numerous empirical studies have proved this same 
premise: the salience placed upon an issue by the media subsequently leads the public to 
perceive these issues with equivalent salience because the news media do not reflect an 
objective reality, but instead filter and shape reality (see: Dunaway, Branton, & 
Abrajano, 2010; Liu, Lindquist, & Vedlitz, 2011; Hopmann, Elmelund-Præstekær, 
Albæk, Vliegenthart, & Vreese, 2012).  While early agenda setting studies were 
predominately conducted in the United States, the theory has subsequently been tested 
in different cultural contexts and media systems (see: Landolt, Goldring, & Bernhard, 
2011; Camaj, 2014; Walgrave, Soroka, & Nuytemans, 2008; Zhang, Shao, & Bowman, 
2012).  The agenda setting theory has also been tested repeatedly outside of strictly 
political communications research in varied fields including business communication 
(Meijer & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006) and advertising (Laxman & Krishnakumar, 2013).   
 It is important to understand, not only that agenda setting occurs, but also why 
agenda setting occurs.  Not all information is pertinent to all audiences.  For example, 
the Finnish Centre Party’s platform on workers’ rights is unlikely to be of importance to 
a voter in South Africa.  This idea or relative importance of information to an individual 
is well encapsulated by the psychological concept: need for orientation.  An individual’s 
need for orientation is a result of their need to be familiar with their surroundings 
(Weaver, 1980).  When dealing with a new uncertainty, as in an unknown candidate or 
complex political issue, individuals are more likely to seek out information on that 
uncertainty from the media, and the more need for orientation someone possesses, the 
greater they are influenced by media effects (Matthes, 2006).  Need for orientation has 
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been demonstrated to be driven by two underlying causes: relevance and uncertainty 
(McCombs & Weaver, 1985).  Relevance is the primary driver of the need for 
orientation. In the case of the South African voter, Finnish politics have very little 
relevance to her, and therefore her need for orientation would be lowered.  However, for 
a Finnish business owner, the Centre Party’s platform on workers’ rights would have 
considerable relevance and therefore she would have a much greater need for 
orientation.  The uncertainty of a political outcome also drives the public’s need for 
orientation.  If an issue is perceived as a “sure thing,” such as when a well-liked 
incumbent candidate is campaigning against a newcomer, then the uncertainty of the 
election will be diminished in the public’s opinion.  When the uncertainty lessens the 
need for orientation will also subsequently lessen, and therefore media effects will be 
diminished (McCombs, 2014).   
 
Framing Theory 
 While object salience has been well defined in agenda setting research, simply 
reporting on an object will shift public attention to that object, and the greater the 
public’s need for orientation, the more likely the public is to seek out information from 
the mass media, thereby increasing agenda setting effects.  As the agenda setting theory 
has developed, it has become clear that not only what the media reports influences the 
public agenda, what McCombs calls “object salience,” but also how the media reports 
on that issue, or “attribute salience” (2014).  McCombs has argued that framing theory 
is not independent from agenda setting, but is, instead an extension of agenda-setting 
theory and should be considered as “second-tier” agenda-setting, stating, “framing is the 
selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the 
media agenda when a particular object is discussed” (1997, p. 37).  As such, this 
understanding of attribute-salience as second level agenda-setting intrinsically links 
framing with agenda setting, as the only concern is the way in which those objects that 
define the media agenda are described. This view focuses on the tone in which objects 
are described: positive, negative or neutral.   
Others argue that framing goes beyond second-level agenda-setting. Robert 
Entman first attempted to conceptualize a coherent theory in political communications 
research in his 1993 work, Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm, 
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wherein he described, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and 
make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (p. 52, emphasis in original).  If the news 
media shapes political reality, the frame is that shape.  According to Entman, frames 
highlight specific information regarding issues thereby lending more salience to those 
aspects than to other aspects of the same issue.  In defining framing in such a broad 
way, there are nearly infinite ways in which the term can be conceptualized.  Druckman 
(2001) notes seven different definitions of frames and framing including “structured 
understandings of the way aspects of the world function” (Goffman, 1974, Fillmore, 
1985), “the way the story is written or produced” (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997, p. 39), 
and “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories 
about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6).   Cacciatore, 
Scheufele, & Iyengar (2016) have posited that due to this overabundance of 
conceptualizations of framing, the term has come to incorporate several different 
distinct and separate phenomena.   
To clear up some of the ambiguity of framing as a concept, for the sake of this 
research, framing is understood as the salience placed on the attributes of those issues 
present in the media agenda.  In analyzing frame building, it will be necessary to 
determine the emotive language used by the news creators in describing the issues that 
constitute the media agenda.   
 
Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 Since media frames and agendas have been proven to be influential on public 
opinion, it is important to understand what influences the creation of frames and 
agendas in the news media.  There is certainly no single variable that is responsible for 
the structuring of media content, but instead McCombs (2014) uses the analogy of 
“peeling an onion.”  Media content is influenced by a number of different forces, which 
can be analyzed from the micro, the nature of the journalists writing the piece, to the 
macro, entire social systems.  Shoemaker and Reese (2014) have identified at least five 
factors that can contribute to frame building from the micro to macro level: the 
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ideological or political orientations of journalists, journalistic routines, organizational 
pressures and constraints, social institutions, and social systems as a whole. 
 The individual journalists who create the stories which are eventually published 
can influence the content of news media.  Despite professional standards and 
journalists’ pronouncements to the contrary, the individual ideologies of media creators 
influence content (Watson, 2014).  In addition to ideologies, many demographic traits 
influence how an individual interprets a phenomenon and subsequently how they 
describe that phenomenon to their audience.  Studies have concluded that the ethnicity 
(Van Sterkenburg, Knoppers, & De Leeuw, 2010), gender (Bruin & Ross, 2004), and 
sexual orientation (Aarons, 1991) of individual journalists all influence media content.   
 The next layer of analysis as proposed by Shoemaker and Reese is that of 
routines.  Routines are understood as the rules which guide individual media producers.  
These rules, which are often unwritten, are a result of constraints placed upon media 
producers by their audience, the source of their information, and the organizations they 
produce media for. For example, considerable studies have been conducted into how 
time constraints when producing and distributing news influence the content.  When 
given less time to produce a story, journalists utilize fewer sources, are more reliant on 
public relations outlets, conduct less crosschecking, and use more textual channels 
(Reich & Godler, 2014).  Lindner (2009) demonstrates that journalists in Iraq during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom were constrained by the sources of their information and 
essentially sorted into three separate groups: those journalists who were embedded with 
American military units, those constrained to Baghdad, and those who were free to 
roam throughout the country.  Lindner concluded that these different routines influenced 
the content of each type of journalist; embedded journalists reported more on the 
experiences of American soldiers, journalists in Baghdad reported more on the 
experiences of Iraqis, and the media content of the free roaming reporters was much 
more balanced.   
 The next layer, the organizational layer, is the primary concern of my research.  
Since news media is produced in a bureaucratic and organizational setting, the media 
organization certainly has the potential to influence content of the media which they 
produce.  Shoemaker and Reese (2014) enumerate several variables at the 
organizational level which can influence media content including ownership, policies, 
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goals, actions, rules, membership, interactions with other organizations, bureaucratic 
structure, economic viability, and stability.  Since all members of a media organizations 
ultimately answer to the person in charge, ownership is very influential in the formation 
of media content.  Privately owned media organizations that are only beholden to a 
single owner have been shown to be more likely to create content that is in line with the 
owner’s interests and report on issues that may be viewed as risky.  Publicly traded 
media organizations, however, are ultimately beholden to their shareholders and as such 
are constrained to producing content which is less risky, reporting on issues which are 
believed to be profitable.  
 The level of social institutions aims to understand the wide variety of influences 
on media content that exist outside of media organizations.  These external influences 
can range from government policy regarding the control of the media, public relations 
firms, and civil society organizations that the media uses as sources.  This is best 
understood by conceptualizing journalism itself as an institution that is intertwined with 
many other institutions.  
 The most macro level layer of influence on media content is that of social 
systems.  Social systems are the base from which all content is constructed.  Social 
systems are often difficult to conceptualize, particularly due to their hegemonic nature, 
but are basically the sum total of relationships between people and their institutions.  
Media systems are often broken down at the nation-state level, as this has traditionally 
been an important division of media systems; however, with the increased 
interconnectedness of the internet age, it is not difficult to conceptualize a global social 
system.   
 
Political Communication in Referendums 
 The UK’s referendum to leave the EU offers a unique opportunity to see how 
organizational variables influence media agenda and frame building.  Unlike more 
traditional political communications, in referendum campaigns there is no clear 
messenger at the top of the hierarchy.  When an individual politician is running for 
office he often has a clearly articulated platform on which he is running.  The content of 
this message is benefitted by the party affiliation of the politician and, increasingly, by a 
cadre of professional communications staff.  The media is then able to rely on the 
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communications and statements from the various individuals and camps competing for 
the office when constructing their coverage.  The press then transfers the object salience 
from the communications of the political actors to the media (Hopmann et al, 2012).  
This traditional paradigm of political communications looks like the model presented in 
Figure 2, p. 10. 
Referendum campaigns, however, bring together a host of diverse parties from 
civil society organizations, political parties, individual politicians and other 
organizations who otherwise might not cooperate. This disparate group rarely 
communicates their position as clearly as a traditional political party (Sherriff, 2015).  
In doing so, referendum campaigns lack exclusive candidates for debates and 
messaging, since individuals are not running as candidates being voted for (Wirth, et al, 
2010).  Additionally, referendum campaigns can fracture parties more often than 
traditional campaigns can.  A model more analogous to this system is shown in  Figure 
3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Political Communication in a Referendum Campaign 
 
 The Brexit campaign followed this more complicated model.  In the 2015 
general election, Prime Minster David Cameron’s Conservative Party won a majority 
government for the first time since 1992 (Bale, 2011), and part of their campaigning had 
hinged upon a referendum on EU membership.  The referendum itself was an attempt to 
deal with a rift that was building between the mainstream core and Eurosceptic factions 
within the party (Cowley & Kavanagh, 2016).  The Conservatives were split over new 
Europhile policies that viewed the free movement of workers and capital as 
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tremendously beneficial to the UK’s economy, while another faction of “old-guard” 
Eurosceptic conservatives were unwilling to concede sovereign control of immigration 
policy necessary for such policies to work (Glencross & SpringerLink, 2016).  This 
schism within the party was also evident in the positions taken by influential 
Conservative politicians, with David Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer George 
Osborne supporting Remain while London’s Mayor Boris Johnson and Justice Secretary 
Michael Gove eventually supporting Leave. Fractions within parties were not unique to 
the Conservative Party either; the official Labour Party position was “Labour In for 
Britain,” yet leader Jeremy Corbyn was frequently derided by the party for not 
campaigning more vocally (Curtice, 2016).  Furthermore, following the vote, it was 
shown that over 70% of Labour constituencies voted to leave (Hanretty, 2016).   
 The Remain and Leave camps eventually sorted into three broad campaign 
groups: Britain Stronger in Europe, Vote Leave, and Grassroots Out/Leave.EU.  Britain 
Stronger in Europe brought together UK business interests, politicians from the Labour, 
Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and Green Parties. The Leave camp brought together 
politicians from United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Conservatives, Labour, 
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and the group Business for Britain 
(Vasilopoulou, 2016).  In addition to the internal division and strange bedfellows from 
Britain’s major political parties and business interests coalescing into the two camps, 
there were also pronouncements from civil society, the military, and foreign leaders as 
well.  
 Referendums reduce numerous policy problems into a single dichotomous 
choice, as was clearly the case in the Brexit campaign.  The decision to leave the EU 
was not based upon a single policy issue, but instead incorporated a myriad of issues.  
EU membership impacts nearly every facet of policy making.  The primary issues 
behind the Brexit debate, according to polling data, was the nexus between immigration, 
the economy, and sovereignty (Curtice, 2016).  Many who wished to leave believed the 
free movement of people was responsible for lowering wages, that labor migrants from 
the EU were outcompeting British citizens for employment, and that the British 
government was powerless to do anything about this as long as they remained members 
of the EU.  However the campaigns were not limited to these issues with debate 
incorporating such diverse issues as public health (see: Iacobucci, 2016), the 
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environment (see: Reid, 2016), and education (see: Matthews, 2016).  In doing so many 
different political discourses can be utilized in the coverage of the referendum 
campaign. 
 The Brexit campaign incorporated a wide variety of issues communicated by a 
diversity of actors and groups, with both sides lacking a coherent communicative 
structure.  Without a strong central communicative structure coming from campaigning 
parties, news producing organizations had more autonomy in their construction of 
agendas and frames.  Because of this, the Brexit campaign offers an excellent 
opportunity to determine how organizational variables, specifically funding models, 
influence both agenda building and frame building in the coverage of this campaign. 
 
The Media System of the UK 
It is important to determine, particularly given the nature of this research 
regarding an expeditionary media player, whether the conceptualization of a nation-state 
centric media system even remains valid in an increasingly globalized media 
environment.  To date, many researchers have attempted to better conceptualize the 
space in which political communication occurs (see Chalaby, 2005; Napoli, 2011; 
Scolari, 2012) many claiming the advent of new media and increasingly globalized 
media has rendered the concept of national media systems obsolete.  However, media 
systems conceptualized around the nation-state remain relevant to political 
communications research because the nation state is at the core of the political process, 
and thus the citizens of a nation state are ultimately the audience of any political 
communication.    
Hallin and Mancini’s seminal work Comparing Media Systems: 3 Models of 
Media and Politics (2004) revitalized the notion of media systems, the most macro layer 
in the hierarchy of influences model, in political communication research.  This work 
attempted to categorize several western countries into 3 taxonomic categories based 
upon the development of media markets, political parallelism, the development of 
journalistic professionalism, and the extent and type of state intervention.  The UK, 
along with the United States, Canada, and Ireland falls within the parameters of a 
Liberal or “Anglo-American” media system.  This system is defined by a strong history 
of commercial press, with little state involvement.  As most political communication 
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research has historically originated in the United States and the UK, this is the most 
widely studied and best understood media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2011).  This 
stream of development led to considerable professionalism of journalism, and a strong 
tradition of “fact-centered” reporting. 
This designation alone does little to understand why the media system in which 
a message is disseminated matters as Hallin and Mancini themselves point out “there 
are important differences between the four countries, enough that we should be careful 
about throwing around the notion of an “Anglo-American” media model too easily” 
(2004, p.246).  The British media system offers a unique opportunity to look at 
organizational variables because it, not only possesses a strong, and open media society 
like other Anglo-American systems, it also has a unique combination of a robust public 
service broadcasting tradition, in addition to a long history of commercial news 
broadcasters.  
At the advent of broadcast journalism, the UK invested heavily in the 
development of a strong public service broadcasting (Medhurst, 2003).  Initially 
concerned about the national security implications of widespread public access to 
broadcasting technologies, the British government kept control of the technologies.  
From the Telegraphy Act of 1869, the Post Office was given the sole right to transmit 
telegraphs, which expanded in 1904 to encompass wireless telephony and ultimately all 
broadcasting.  Following the First World War and under commercial pressure from 
radio manufacturers, the British government relaxed its stance on radio transmission 
solely in service to national security, and more and more British citizens were 
purchasing radio receivers for entertainment, which the Post Office continued to license.  
By 1923, the Postmaster General set out to review the finances of the state controlled 
broadcasters, and, led by Frederick Sykes determined that broadcasting was hugely 
important to the nation and performed a valuable public service, additionally, Sykes 
believed that advertisements would lower standards and recommended a license fee to 
fund public content (Crisell, 1997).  
This early model led to the foundation of the architype of public service 
broadcasters: The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).  The BBC was founded by 
royal charter in 1926 with the stated mission of, “to inform, educate, and entertain,” 
which has remained unchanged for over 90 years (House of Lords, 2016).  The BBC 
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remains a publicly funded organization, that has limited autonomy from the British 
state.  The government does not have direct control of BBC operations, instead it is 
governed by a board of governors and a director-general, although, the board is 
appointed by the state (Crisell, 1997).  The BBC continues to be funded by license fees 
paid by individuals within the UK who own television receivers to watch live television 
broadcasts or watch BBC programs online on the BBC’s website (TV licensing), yet, it 
is the state that sets the price of licenses, not the BBC.  The BBC’s governing and 
funding structures are unique among the three media organizations being researched.  
While not receiving direct financing from the state, the BBC is still required to adhere to 
a legal structure presented in both its royal charter as well as its Framework Agreement 
with the UK Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport.  These two documents, 
grant the BBC its constitutional basis, as well as its independence from the government 
(Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, 2016a; 2016b).  Management of the 
BBC comes from two separate organizations, the BBC Trust as well as the BBC 
Executive Board.  The Trust is comprised of 10 trustees as well as a chairman and vice-
chairman (BBC Trust).  Each member of the Trust is appointed by the Queen, with 
consultation with the Parliament and professional bureaucrats in the Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport.  The Trust is responsible for broad governance of the 
BBC, ensuring the interests of license holders are maintained.  The operational 
management of the BBC is overseen by the Executive Board, which is comprised of 13 
executives appointed by the Trust.  The Royal Charter, which outlines the 
organizational structure, as well as the Framework Agreement, which regulates the 
BBC’s activities, are issued by the UK government, which are only issued for fixed 
periods of time, and so must periodically be renewed.  As part of the Agreement, the 
BBC is required to report on the proceedings of the British Parliament, broadcast 
government messages in the case of a national emergency, and provide political 
balance, additionally the BBC is prohibited from airing advertising, and editorializing 
(Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, 2016a; 2016b).   
In addition to a strong public service broadcasting history, the British media 
system also has a long history of commercial broadcasters, something unique in Europe.  
The BBC enjoyed a monopoly on the British airwaves for quite some time, but many in 
the UK questioned the value of this monopoly on British society.  The Popular 
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Television Association, a civil society organization, was founded in July 1953, with the 
goal of educating the public on the dangers posed to society by a television monopoly 
(Briggs, 2000).  This soon led to the passing of the Television Act of 1954, which 
legally broke the monopoly of the BBC and allowed for competition.  On September 22, 
1955 the first commercial broadcast, and first television advertisement, was viewed on 
British television (Crisell, 1997).  In the decade that followed, little competition, and the 
British television system was comprised of only the BBC and the sole commercial 
competitor, Independent Television (ITV), however by the 1970’s the UK had 
developed a pluralist media system comprised of increasing variety of commercial 
broadcasters, as well as a prominent public service broadcaster in the BBC (Medhurst, 
2003).  The British media system is unique in possessing both a strong public service 
broadcaster as well as a well-developed commercial broadcasting sector, as many media 
systems are comprised of one model or the other. As late as the 1980’s the UK was one 
of three European nations without a media system completely dominated by publicly 
owned and run public service broadcasters (Noam, 1991).   
Sky News is a well-developed commercial news producer with a history in the 
British media milieu stretching back to 1989.  Sky was founded by the media 
entrepreneur Rupert Murdoch to take advantage of the increased availability and interest 
in satellite television at the time and was the first 24-hour news channel in the UK.  As 
of December 2016, Sky is a publicly traded company, with Murdoch’s 21st Century Fox 
holding the largest minority stake at 39% (Jackson & Martinson, 2016).  Sky is 
governed by a board of directors, comprised of 11 individuals, with the stated role of 
taking “a long-term outlook and [seeing] itself as responsible to a wide range of 
stakeholders, whilst pursuing its objectives in a manner consistent with its statutory 
duties, for the benefit of the Company’s members as a whole.” (Sky plc, 2017, p. 38).  
Additionally, unlike other commercial news producers in the UK such as ITV, and 
Channel 4, Sky News is not a commercial public service broadcaster, and as such is not 
required to adhere to the same restrictions of content (Ramsey, 2016). 
RT UK offers further model of ownership, unlike either commercial 
broadcasters or public service broadcasters.  Founded in 2005, Russia Today was, and 
remains, solely funded by the Russian state, and quickly changed to the name ‘RT’ to 
create more distance between the organization and the Russian state (Yablokov, 2015).  
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According to the broadcasting license filed with the British regulatory authority on 
broadcasting, telecommunications, and postal technologies, The Office of 
Communications, commonly referred to as Ofcom, RT UK’s broadcasting in the UK is 
operated by the Autonomous Non-Profit Organization (ANO) TV Novosti (Ofcom,n.d.).  
ANO TV Novosti is ostensibly an independent private organization, though the actual 
functioning of the organization remains opaque.  This non-profit organization was spun 
off from the Russian government-owned media organization RIA Novosti in order to 
provide increased editorial and operational distance from the Russian state.  RT UK was 
founded in London in 2014 with the stated goal of, “to challenge dominant power 
structures in Britain by broadcasting live and original programming with a progressive 
UK focus” and to “serve the needs and interests of the British public by promoting 
debate and new ways of thinking about specifically British issues” (RT, 2014).  RT UK 
is one of several attempts of expeditionary media organizations to found production 
centers within the target market.  RT UK is overseen by a single Editor-In-Chief and a 
Managing Director (RT, n.d.).  The opacity of RT UK’s management structure makes it 
difficult to track organizational responsibility, but operational funding comes directly 
from the Russian state, and has increased annually (Shuster, 2015; RT, n.d.).  The 
ostensible editorial independence of RT was raised by Russian President Vladimir Putin 
in a 2013 interview with the organization wherein he stated,  
We never expected this to be a news agency or a channel which would 
defend the position of the Russian political line. We wanted to bring 
an absolutely independent news channel to the news arena. Certainly 
the channel is funded by the government, so it cannot help but reflect 
the Russian government’s official position on the events in our 
country and in the rest of the world one way or another.  
RT UK also utilizes the motto, “Question More,” and assumes a news agenda to offer 
alternatives to what it perceives as a hegemonic western, and specifically Anglo-Saxon, 
news media (Yablokov, 2015).  Since RT UK’s annual operational budget comes 
directly from the Russian State, the organization is not reliant on profits to continue to 
operate in the same way a commercial news organization is, nor is RT UK beholden to 
its audience as a direct operational funding model in the same way the BBC is. 
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Does Funding Influence Media Content? 
 
According to the Hierarchy of Influences theory, all individuals within a media 
organization ultimately answer to the owner, and therefore different ownership models 
should influence the content produced by varying media organizations (Shoemaker & 
Reese, 2014).  Therefore, funding model serves as a better descriptor of what 
differentiates these three organizations.  The variety in content produced by public 
service broadcasters and commercial broadcasters has been well researched in political 
communications studies (see: Wasburn, 1995; Roca-Cuberes, 2014).  Throughout 
western democratic societies, public service content has been proved to produce content 
that is politically neutral, detailed, and longer than the content produced by commercial 
broadcasters (Newton, 2016).  Media ownership influencing media content has been 
demonstrated across varying cultural settings, as well in reporting across different 
subject areas (see: Rogers, et. al., 2014; Ayish, 2010; Hollifield, 1999).  This has been 
explained by the overriding mission of varying types of broadcasters.  Public service 
broadcasters are accountable to the public, who fund these services, and in most cases, 
are legally required to remain neutral and provide information for citizens.  Commercial 
broadcasters have a different mission, they operate as a business and as such their 
primary goal to make a profit, though commercial broadcasters vary depending upon the 
ownership structure.  Corporate commercial news broadcasters are beholden to a board 
of directors and produce content that has previously been shown to be profitable, and 
are less likely to engage in risky or controversial news coverage in order to maximize 
their audiences and therefore their profits.  Privately owned commercial news 
broadcasters, while still primarily concerned with generating profits, have more of a 
directive to produce content that will please the owner (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).   
While ownership has traditionally been used to describe the organizational 
variety, this is a difficult concept to utilize in this context, as RT UK is not necessarily 
owned by anyone, simply managed by a non-profit, and the BBC is owned by the 
British public.  Instead, the primary difference between these three media organizations 
is the model of their funding.  So, the issue then becomes whether funding models 
influence the content of the news media.  J. Herbert Altschull, in his 1984 work Agents 
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of Power: The Role of the news Media in Human Affairs, asserted that one of the “laws 
of journalism” was that news media content always reflects the interests of those who 
finance the system.  Shoemaker and Reese (2014) propose a more intricate model 
influencing news content production, but it still incorporates business models and 
funding models as influencing content.  Dunaway (2013), while analyzing varying 
ownership models of privately owned newspapers, determined that those organizations 
that were most driven by profit maximization, namely corporately owned newspapers, 
with funding dispersed across many owners, produced more content with negative tones 
than did privately owned newspapers, where funding originated from a single owner.  
Lengauer, Esser, & Berganza (2012) explain the increased negative coverage in 
commercial news producers by its evolutionary and discursive relevance.  Audiences 
are drawn to negative news because of a genetic hardwiring to protect oneself from 
threats, and profit maximizing organizations exploit this when creating news to attract 
the largest possible audience.  Additional studies (see: Dunaway, 2008; Gentzkow, & 
Shapiro, 2010) have concluded that media organizations primarily concerned with profit 
maximization produce content which is more negative in tone, less detailed, with less 
focus on political issues and policy.  All of these aspects of corporate media are driven 
by the desire to increase the audience size of these organizations and thereby increase 
profits.   
Unlike commercial news organizations, public service broadcasters are believed 
to produce content that is more neutral and balanced than that of commercial 
broadcasters.  Public service broadcasters are stipulated to produce content which 
“informs and educates, helps imagine the nation, enriches the lives and culture of its 
citizens and provides an inclusive public sphere to support democracy” (Esser, & 
Jensen, 2015, p.1).  Specifically, the BBC in the UK is legally required to broadcast all 
designated political party broadcasts as well as referendum broadcasts (Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport, 2016b).  While the BBC is funded through license 
fees, these traits are also present in those public service providers that are funded from 
governments’ general funds as well.  These requirements, in addition to a funding 
scheme that does not maximize profit seeking, or even incorporate profits whatsoever, 
should lead to the production of content that is diverse, politically neutral, detailed, and 
with a greater emphasis on policy (Newton, 2016).   
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RT UK is an expeditionary media organization funded by a foreign government, 
the Russian State, with its operational funding coming directly from a foreign budget.  
Since RT UK’s funding is guaranteed, the organization is not concerned with profit 
maximization as a corporately owned media organization is.  Additionally, RT UK is 
not obligated to fulfill any public service role, with no stipulation to produce content 
that will benefit the public.  Instead, RT UK was founded, “to challenge dominant 
power structures in Britain by broadcasting live and original programming with a 
progressive UK focus,” with individuals within the organization claiming to counter the 
hegemonic media system in the UK and “covering issues that have formerly remained 
beyond the media spotlight of the nation.” (RT, 2014).   Additionally, RT UK grew 
from a concerted effort by the Russian government to cultivate soft power abroad, and 
introduce a "Russian viewpoint” (RT, n.d.).  Therefore, I propose that RT UK’s 
coverage of the Brexit campaign will build agendas and frames that align with the 
interests of the Russian State, and which are separate from “traditional” British media 
organizations.   
As public service broadcasters are required to produce content that benefits all 
segments of a society, they generally produce content that is longer and more detailed. 
Therefore BBC should construct its media agenda with more issues than either RT UK 
or Sky News. 
 
H1: BBC’s agenda in its coverage of the Brexit campaign will include more 
issues than either that of the RT UK or Sky News. 
 
Since profit maximization behavior has been shown to influence the content 
production of corporate news organizations, this should be evident in the agenda 
building of Sky News’ coverage of the Brexit campaign, with increased coverage of 
sensational issues that draw increased audience numbers.  The BBC, meanwhile should 
construct an agenda that has more even coverage of various events in accordance with 
its mandate to provide the British public with information required on all aspects of the 
Brexit decision.  Since RT UK’s funding comes directly from the Russian State, RT 
UK’s content is not driven by profit maximization, and therefore the coverage should 
highlight those issues which are pertinent to Russia.  Additionally, RT UK’s stated 
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mission to offer alternative coverage from the British media establishment, should 
emphasize alternative issues than either of the other two organizations. 
 
H2: RT UK and Sky News will construct agendas in coverage of the Brexit 
campaign with higher level of issue salience focused on fewer issues than will 
the BBC. 
 
Additionally, the organizational constraints on emotive language should be more 
influential in the political communication coverage of a public service broadcaster, due 
to its core mission of providing unbiased information, than either of the other two 
organizational types: 
 
H3: RT UK’s and Sky News’ coverage of the Brexit campaign will exhibit a 
greater range of attribute salience than will the BBC’s coverage. 
 
However, profit maximization behavior should not influence RT UK to create 
consistently negative content such as a corporate media organization would through the 
exploitation of evolutionary and discursive relevance as described by Lengauer, Esser, 
& Berganza (2012).  Also, by desiring to promote a Russian viewpoint that is promoted 
as an alternative to the hegemonic British media framing of issues, RT UK could 
positively frame issues which are universally framed as negative by traditional British 
media organizations.  Therefore, while BBC’s attribute salience should remain 
relatively neutral due to its organizational variables, Sky News should produce 
increasingly negative content, and RT UK should frame various issues as either 
negative or positive to highlight the Russian viewpoint or offer alternatives to the 
hegemonic media portrayal of varying issues.   
 
H4: Attribute salience surrounding all reported issues will be most 
negative in Sky news’ coverage of the Brexit campaign, predominately 
neutral in the BBC’s coverage, and polarized in RT UK’s coverage. 
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Methodology   
  
My research began with a quantitative textual content analysis of news stories 
published on the websites of three news media sources: the BBC, Sky News, and RT 
UK.  The samples came from reporting in three distinct time periods in 2016: the week 
of February 21-27 when the date of the referendum vote was first announced by the 
Cameron Government, April 17-23 the first week the campaign officially began, and 
June 19-25 the week of the referendum vote.  In conceptualizing the research to test 
hypothesis one, the agendas of each producer serve as the dependent variable, and the 
organizational constraints serve as independent variables.  Testing hypothesis two is 
conceptualized similarly, with the frames around each issue serving as the independent 
variable and the organizations again serving as the dependent variables.  I controlled for 
as many unintended variables as possible by analyzing all Brexit related reporting 
during the same distinct timeframe.   
 
The Media Organizations 
 The organizational differences driven by their respective funding models of the 
three news media producers serve as the independent variables in this research.  It is 
important to note that these three media sources, the BBC, Sky News, and RT UK, were 
selected for examination because of the similarities between the three organizations.  
These organizations comprise three of the four 24-hour news broadcasters available 
over the UK terrestrial broadcasting platform Freeview.  In addition to the widespread 
distribution via digital terrestrial broadcasting, the television broadcasts of the three 
organizations are carried on a variety of cable and satellite providers throughout the UK.  
Besides the prominent position of the three news organizations on British televisions, 
they also have very active online presences; the Facebook page of RT has over 4 million 
likes, that of Sky News has over 7 million, and BBC News has over 40 million.  Also, 
all three organizations have active English-language websites where they publish 
regularly.  By selecting organizations with such similar outlets, I hoped to control for 
more micro level variables.  For example, the routines of a broadsheet journalist could 
be sufficiently varied from that of a television news writer to influence the dependent 
variables.  Additionally, all three organizations are based in the UK, and produce 
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content within the UK.  By excluding media content produced in different societal 
environments, I hope to control for variables at the social systems level.    
 
Timeframe 
I selected the three time periods (February 21-27, April 17-23, and June 19-25, 
2016) for analysis because they offer a sufficient depth and diversity of reporting.  
These varied time frames each correspond with important events in the referendum 
campaign, February 21-27 corresponds with the first full week after official 
announcement on February 20th by the Cameron government of that the referendum 
vote would take place on June 23rd.  The week of April 17-23 corresponds with the 
week immediately following the naming of the official leave and stay campaigns on 
April 15th.  The week of June 19-25 corresponds with the polling day on June 23rd and 
announcement of the results on June 24th.  These important periods in the campaign 
ensure considerable coverage by all three media organizations.  Additionally, by 
analyzing reporting in a varied temporal scale throughout the campaign, I attempted to 
ensure sufficient variety of the larger scale agendas and framing constructed by each 
organization.  The varied time scale also was utilized to reduce the likelihood that a 
single external variable would be able to dominate the reporting of all three 
organizations over that period of time.   
 
Referendum 
 I chose the Brexit referendum campaign as the subject of comparison because of 
the amount of autonomy media organizations had in constructing agendas and frames.  
A myriad of different interests coalesced in the “leave” and “stay” camps for varied 
reasons.  This variety of voices incorporated different British political parties, NGOs, 
and business interests, and as such there is less of a coherent message from the political 
elite driving the agenda and frame building in the media (Wirth, et. al., 2010).  
Additionally, this referendum incorporated a strong relevance for the British public for 
the same reason that so many disparate parties were involved in the campaign, the 
decision to leave the EU would impact nearly every aspect of the lives of citizens of the 
UK.  EU membership has shaped not only those policy areas influencing international 
cooperation within the UK, but influences nearly every domestic and foreign policy 
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area, and even has influenced national norms and values (Kassim, Peters, & Wright, 
2000).   
 
Operationalization  
 In order to determine how each organization built their agendas and frames 
around the Brexit campaign a single researcher hand coded all stories containing the 
terms “Brexit” or “referendum” published on the websites of each of the three news 
organizations throughout three distinct one-week periods.  Quantitative content analysis 
was undertaken to analyze the amount of data necessary to determine the larger trends 
in agenda building and frame building at the organizational level, a more critical 
analysis of a smaller sample size of reporting may not accurately encounter 
organizational variation, as the smaller samples selected could be heavily influenced by 
individual reporters, or routines.  Coding was conducted by hand despite the advent of 
automated coding software, as this is still the “gold standard” in content analysis, and 
allows for a more nuanced analysis of tone than does computerized content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004). 
 To begin, I created a coding frame (see: appendix 1) used for the analysis.  This 
was done by first selecting five random articles from each of the three organizations at 
arbitrary periods, outside of the periods of analysis, throughout the campaign.  Each 
sentence from these 15 articles was then printed out onto small strips of paper.  These 
sentences were then grouped by theme, and each code was developed from these 
groupings (Vogt, 2011).  Those codes that are central to this study include those I 
labeled: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Horserace – polling data and public perception of individuals or campaigns. 
 
Economy – the effects of remaining or leaving on the British economy directly, jobs, 
and currency valuation. 
 
Coalition Building – which actors (politicians, NGOs, celebrities, etc.) are joining 
which camp. 
 
Migration – movement of people into or out of the UK. 
 
Sovereignty – stories regarding the UK making its own laws, self-rule, or imposed law 
from the EU. 
 
EU Reform – renegotiating the relationship between the UK and EU. 
 
Trade – coverage of free trade, trade deals, or the single market. 
 
Security – references to national defense, or security threats. 
 
Uncertainty – the ambiguity of what leaving or remaining means for the future of the 
UK or the EU. 
 
Sport – coverage of any specific sport (i.e. football), sport generally, or athletes and the 
effect of a potential Brexit. 
 
US-UK Relations – any mention of the “special relationship” or any relations between 
the US and the UK. 
 
Healthcare – coverage of healthcare professionals, the NHS, or medication. 
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 Coding was conducted on a sentence level of analysis, and the stories analyzed 
directly from the websites of each news media organization; www.bbc.co.uk/news, 
www.rt.com/uk/, and news.sky.com.  By analyzing native content from the source 
websites, instead of relying on databases of reports such as LexisNexis, I was able to 
better understand the nuanced communications present in the pieces that might not be 
available on text-only databases, such as in photos, embedded videos, and tweets, all of 
which could be important in determining the varied tone surrounding issues necessary to 
understand frame building.  I chose to rely on a single coder so that this research was 
not concerned with inter-coder reliability.   
 
Testing Hypotheses One and Two 
 Following data collection, I analyzed the raw data into usable metrics.  The 
occurrence of each issue in the coverage of each media organization was weighed 
against the sum of issue coverage of the same media organization to determine the 
relative salience placed on the issue by the organization.   
 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑛 =
∑𝐶𝐼𝑛
∑𝐶
 
Where 𝑆𝐼𝑛 is the Salience of Issue n 
𝐶𝐼𝑛 is the Coverage of Issue n 
𝐶 is the Coverage of all Issues 
From this analysis, I was able to determine the relative salience placed on each issue by 
all three of the media organizations, and thereby have a metric with which to compare 
the salience placed on each issue by the BBC, Sky News, and RT UK.  
 
Testing Hypothesis Three and Four 
 In order to determine the frames constructed by the varied media organizations, 
testing hypothesis three relied on a qualitative analysis along with the initial quantitative 
analysis associated with testing hypotheses one and two.  In addition to determining the 
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salience of issues, I analyzed the emotive language, images, and videos utilized in the 
reporting of the various issues to determine the attribute salience of each issue.  This 
information was coded simultaneously with the quantity of issue coverage using a three-
point scale of negative, neutral, or positive.  This attribution will comprise a scale from  
-1 to +1, -1 being a negative attribution to the issue, 0 being a neutral attribution, and +1 
being a positive attribution, such that: 
𝐴𝑆 =
𝐴1 + 𝐴2 + ⋯ 𝐴𝑛
𝑛𝐴
 
Where 𝐴𝑆 is attribute salience 
𝐴1is the first attribution, 𝐴2 the second, etc 
𝑛𝐴 is the total number of attributes for the issue 
Which will give a total attribute salience numeric value between -1 and 1.  This method 
of analysis allows for framing neutrality to be the result of either overall neutral 
language by the content producer, or a pluralistic presentation of both positive and 
negative views of a single issue. This metric was then used to compare the relative 
framing of each issue between the various media organizations. 
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Results 
Issue Salience 
 Upon completion of coding for all of the referendum related stories over the 
length of the analyzed period, the total number of stories for each media organizations 
was: 
BBC: n = 152 
Sky News: n = 132 
RT UK: n = 71 
 
The total number of recorded issues throughout the analyzed period consisted of: 
BBC: n = 2890 
Sky News: n = 1970 
RT UK: n = 887 
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Table 1. Issue Salience in Sky News 
Issue Frequency Reported Issue Salience 
Economy 424 0.222 
Horserace 408 0.214 
Coalition Building 217 0.114 
Migration 209 0.110 
Sovereignty 92 0.048 
EU Reform 88 0.046 
Trade 85 0.045 
Security 62 0.033 
Uncertainty 43 0.023 
US-UK Relations 31 0.016 
Sport 27 0.014 
Healthcare 23 0.012 
British-Irish Relations 19 0.010 
 
 
Throughout the period of analysis the issue salience of those issues comprising 
at least 1% of Sky News’ coverage consisted of considerable coverage of two very 
prominent issues with issue salience scores of 0.2 or higher: Economy, and Horserace; 
two moderately prominent issues with issue salience scores between 0.1 and 0.2: 
Coalition Building, and Migration; and nine slightly prominent issues with issue 
salience scores between 0.01 and 0.1: Sovereignty, EU Reform, Trade, Security, 
Uncertainty, US-UK Relations, Sport, Healthcare, and British-Irish Relations as seen in 
Table 1.   
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table 2. Issue Salience in the BBC 
Issue Frequency Reported Issue Salience 
Economy 522 0.181 
Horserace 443 0.153 
Coalition Building 297 0.103 
Migration 287 0.099 
Sovereignty 201 0.070 
Trade 168 0.058 
EU Reform 136 0.047 
Security 95 0.033 
Uncertainty 75 0.026 
Research 67 0.023 
Agriculture 65 0.022 
US-UK Relations 58 0.020 
Environmental Policy 56 0.019 
EU Funds 53 0.018 
Healthcare 33 0.011 
Irrevocability 32 0.011 
 
Throughout this period the issue salience comprising at least 1% of the BBC’s 
coverage consisted of no very prominent issues with issue salience scores above 0.2; 
three moderately prominent issues with issue salience scores between 0.1 and 0.2: 
Economy, Horserace, and Coalition Building; and 13 slightly prominent issues with 
issue salience scores between 0.10 and 0.1: Migration, Sovereignty, Trade, EU Reform, 
Security, Uncertainty, Research, Agriculture, US-UK Relations, Environmental Policy, 
EU Funds, Healthcare, and Irrevocability as evident in Table 2. 
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Table 3. Issue Salience in the RT UK 
Issue Frequency 
Reported 
Issue Salience 
Horserace 164 0.185 
Economy 121 0.136 
Migration 106 0.120 
US-UK Relations 85 0.100 
Sovereignty 56 0.063 
Coalition Building 54 0.061 
Security 36 0.041 
Trade 36 0.041 
EU Reform 31 0.035 
Racism 16 0.018 
British-Irish Relations 16 0.018 
Nazism 10 0.011 
Workers’ Rights 9 0.010 
Influence 9 0.010 
Turkish EU Membership 9 0.010 
 
Throughout this period the issue salience comprising at least 1% of RT UK’s 
coverage consisted of no very prominent issues with issue salience scores above 0.2; 
four moderately prominent issues with issue salience scores between 0.1 and 0.2: 
Horserace, Economy, Migration, and US-UK Relations; and 11 slightly prominent 
issues with issue salience scores between 0.10 and 0.1: Sovereignty, Coalition Building, 
Security, Trade, EU Reform, Racism, British-Irish Relations, Nazism, Workers’ Rights, 
Influence, and Turkish EU Membership as demonstrated in Table 3. 
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Figure 4 demonstrates the 10 most prominent issues as covered by all three 
media organizations analyzed.  It is clear from this figure that the general media agenda 
was constructed relatively consistently between the three organizations, with some 
obvious differences.  Sky News was the only organization to produce content with issue 
salience scores greater than 0.2 in coverage of the economy and horserace.  While these 
two issues were also the most prominent in the coverage of the other two organizations, 
no other organization devoted so much of their reportage to these issues.  The BBC’s 
coverage of the Brexit campaign has clearly placed more salience on the issues of the 
economy and horserace coverage and follows the same general trend in issue salience as 
has Sky News, however has more even coverage, unlike the precipitous drops that 
characterize Sky News’ issue salience.  RT UK’s coverage generally reported on the 
same issues as the two traditional British media organizations, with the key exception of 
heavily reporting on US-UK Relations in the context of the Brexit campaign, and 
devoting little coverage to the uncertainty associated with a vote to leave.   
 
  
Figure 4. Most Prominent Issues 
 
Attribute Salience 
 Table 4 shows the attribute salience of those issues that had sufficient coverage 
to provide statistically significant results for at least two of the three media 
organizations.  From this data there is no clear trend or commonality among the 
0
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different organizations regarding the method in which issues were framed, with the 
exception of a nearly universal trend towards negative emotive language from all 
organizations. 
 
Table 4. Attribute Salience 
Issue Sky News BBC RT UK 
Economy -.34 -.17 -.56 
Horserace -.35 -.15 -.30 
Coalition Building -.27 -.08 -.13 
Migration -.34 -.11 -.49 
Sovereignty -.29 -.07 -.36 
US-UK Relations -.06 -.15 -.73 
EU Reform -.08 -.12 -.16 
Trade -.16 -.08 -.47 
Security .13 .07 -.22 
Uncertainty -.42 -.17 n/a 
Sport .22 .11 n/a 
Healthcare .04 -.24 n/a 
EU Funds -.22 .11 n/a 
Second Referendum -.47 -.13 n/a 
Scottish Independence -.08 -.18 n/a 
Future Generations -.36 -.10 n/a 
Agriculture -.11 .12 n/a 
British-Irish Relations -.26 n/a -.38 
    
 Additionally, I charted the total range of attribute salience for each media 
organization or all issues with at least ten reported instances to determine the total tone 
of reporting across the Brexit debate.  Figure 5 shows this total, with Sky News’ 
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coverage possessing a range of attribute salience scores from -.60 to .22 with the 
majority of coverage trending negative from -.34 to -.08 and a median score of -.24 and 
a mean of -.20.  Excluding a single outlier, that of the issue Influence, with an attribute 
salience score of 0.50, BBC’s coverage consists of attribute salience scores ranging 
from -.29 to .14, the majority trending slightly negative of neutral from -.17 to .05 with 
a median score of -.10 and a mean of -.08.  RT UK’s coverage is comprised of entirely 
negative attribute salience scores ranging from -.80 to -.13, the majority falling between 
-.65 and -.24, with a median score of -.43 and a mean of -.44. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Attribute Salience of All Coverage 
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Discussion 
Agenda Building 
 When reviewing the results from the issue salience survey, there are clear trends 
between all three media organizations to highlight potential economic implications of 
the referendum result and to report heavily on horserace stories.  Following those issues, 
the BBC and Sky News devoted considerable time to coalition building stories, which 
RT UK did not focus on nearly as much.  After those issues, the three organizations 
placed similar importance on the issues of migration, sovereignty, EU reform, trade, and 
security.  Subsequently, the BBC and Sky News produced content regarding the 
uncertainty of the UK leaving the EU, an issue that was not featured as prominently in 
RT UK’s coverage.  The final issue of note is that of US-UK relations; while this was 
reported on by all three news producers, it was featured considerably more visibly in RT 
UK’s coverage than in the other organizations. 
 Horserace coverage has become ubiquitous in contemporary campaign 
journalism, and so it is not surprising that it played such a prominent role in all three 
media organizations coverage of the Brexit campaign (Matthews, Pickup, & Cutler, 
2012).  Horserace coverage has been shown to dominate political campaign coverage 
since at least the early 1990s because it draws in audiences.  There is debate as to why 
this is, but it is a reality of contemporary campaign journalism (Iyengar, Norpoth, & 
Hahn, 2004).  This coverage increased towards the end of the campaign, as polls 
continued to show a closer race between the two camps, contrary to what many believed 
would be a sure thing for the remain camp at the beginning of the campaign.  It is 
unsurprising then, that all three media organizations featured horserace stories so 
prominently. 
 Along with horserace coverage, BBC and Sky News devoted considerable 
content to coalition building.  This coverage was likely featured so prominently given 
the nature of the referendum campaign.  Coalition building coverage persisted 
throughout the campaign, but was particularly prevalent in the first week of analysis.  
Of particular note was the division of members within traditional British political 
parties.  Prime Minister David Cameron, who called the referendum, in part, to unify his 
own Conservative Party, which was divided over European Union membership (Curtice, 
2016), and so, permitted his cabinet and other prominent Conservatives to campaign 
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however they chose, instead of following the official government position.  A story 
heavily reported on in this period was the decision of London Mayor, Boris Johnson, to 
join the leave camp, with headlines from the BBC including, “Will Boris Johnson Sway 
the EU referendum result?”, and “Boris Johnson 'expected to back EU exit.'”  Sky News 
also featured coalition building stories, with the headlines, “Boris Johnson Backs 
Campaign To Leave EU” and “Boris Announces Who He Will Back in EU Campaign.”  
So, it is of note that while RT UK’s constructed does agenda feature considerable 
coalition building coverage, it comprises a significantly lesser proportion of the total 
agenda than the other two organizations.  The issue salience score of RT UK’s coverage 
is 0.061, considerably lower than both Sky News’ at 0.114, and the BBC at 0.103.  This 
is likely tied to RT UK’s funding model, particularly its mandate from its governing 
organization to provide a Russian viewpoint, which is focused more on external issues 
and explanations than domestic British politics, despite claiming that they are the “only 
major UK news broadcaster headquartered near the corridors of power, just minutes 
from the four pillars the UK establishment - the Supreme Court, the Church of England, 
Whitehall and the Palace of Westminster” (RT, 2014).   
 The economic implications of the UK leaving the EU was the cornerstone of the 
remain campaign.  For the entirety of the campaign, the remain camp warned of the 
economic risks to a myriad of industries, while emphasizing the importance of 
membership within the single market and the benefits of free trade with Europe to the 
British economy.  The leave camp also heavily referenced the British economy, citing 
issues such as the sums of money that the UK pays to the EU and stating that EU 
regulations were stifling the British economy.  The economy was heavily tied to many 
other issues surrounding the debate as well.  The issue of migration was closely related 
to the economy on both sides, with the remain camp citing the benefits brought about by 
the free movement of people, and the leave camp claiming that European labor migrants 
were outcompeting unemployed British job seekers.  The economy was also closely 
linked with the issue of agriculture, as the remain camp touted the importance of EU 
subsidies for British farmers, while the leave campaign claimed the EU’s Common 
Agriculture Policy disadvantaged British farmers, who would benefit economically by 
leaving.  Because of this prominence of the economic arguments for both leaving and 
remaining, as well as the intertwined nature of the British economy with many disparate 
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issues, it is unsurprising that this issue would feature so conspicuously throughout all 
three media organizations and was a major aspect of the media agenda.    
 The issue of US-UK relations was featured in the agenda of all three media 
organizations, primarily due to a visit by then US president Barack Obama to the UK on 
April 21st, 2016. At this time, he made statements that the UK would be best served by 
remaining in the EU, and that “I think it’s fair to say that maybe some point down the 
line there might be a UK-US trade agreement, but it’s not going to happen any time 
soon because our focus is in negotiating with a big bloc, the European Union, to get a 
trade agreement done… The UK is going to be in the back of the queue” (The Guardian, 
2016).  This statement contradicted the leave campaign’s claim that, were the UK to 
leave the EU, it would be free to pursue trade agreements with any country and not 
restricted to greater EU trade agreements.  Following Obama’s statement, Boris Johnson 
claimed that the statements were hypocritical, claiming that, “I think there's a weird 
paradox when the President of the Unites States, a country that would never dream of 
sharing its sovereignty over anything, instructs or urges us politely to get more 
embedded in the EU, which is already making 60% of our laws” (BBC, 2016).  While 
this issue was reported on by both the BBC and Sky News, with issue salience scores of 
0.020 and 0.016 respectively, it featured more centrally in RT UK’s agenda building of 
the Brexit campaign, with an issue salience score of 0.100.  This is the most prominent 
shift in agenda building, and demonstrates the connections between RT UK and the 
Russian State.  Much of this coverage parroted the Russian concerns about the 
preservation of sovereignty (Laidi, 2012), and anti-Americanism (Shlapentokh, 2009).   
 Of particular note regarding the constructed agendas is the commonality among 
the three organizations.  The majority of all content was comprised the same eight core 
issues: economy, horserace, coalition building, migration, sovereignty, EU reform, 
trade, and security.  In addition, there is strong correlation in the ranking of issues, using 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficient: 
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Where x is the sample mean of organization x 
 
And y is the sample mean of organization y 
 
From these samples the r correlation coefficient values are 0.98 for Sky News and the 
BBC, 0.91 for Sky News and RT UK, and 0.87 for the BBC and RT UK.  This strong 
correlation suggests that some other variable has a greater influence on agenda building.  
It would make sense that higher order variables, those at the levels of institutions and 
social systems, would place considerable pressure on these diverse media organizations 
to cover those issues that make up the bulk of the common agenda.  Much of the 
coverage that was repeated among the three organizations.  For example, much of the 
economy coverage across the three organizations included many of the same quotes and 
figures from external institutions, such as the Bank of England, and business leaders 
from the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 index.  Additionally, much of the US-
UK relations coverage utilized the same information provided by the US president, and 
coalition building content included the same quotes and statements provided by British 
political parties and leaders.  All of this suggesting that institutional influencers may be 
more influential to agenda building than those at the organizational level.  Although, as 
all three organizations create content within the UK, the agenda could also reflect those 
issues which are valued by British society, and therefore be influenced by social system 
influences.   
 In addition to the 10 prominent issues discussed above, all three organizations’ 
agenda included additional issues which comprised at least 1% of all reporting.  For the 
BBC, this included six additional issues: research, agriculture, environmental policy, 
EU funds, healthcare, and the irrevocability of the vote.  With the exception of the 
irrevocability of the vote, these issues focus on real policy implications of both sides of 
the debate.  The healthcare issue was prominent due to the leave campaign’s insistence 
that the British government sends £350 million per week to the EU and they propose 
spending this money instead on the National Health Service (NHS).  This claim was 
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written across a campaign bus used by the official leave campaign, and spurred debate 
about the actual ramifications of the referendum on the healthcare system of the UK.  
These are issues that affect the lives of British citizens and would be influenced by the 
outcome of the referendum. 
 Sky News’ agenda consisted of three additional issues: sport, healthcare, and 
British-Irish relations.  As with the BBC, Sky News reported on the healthcare debate 
prompted by the leave campaign’s bus slogan.  The Republic of Ireland is the only EU 
member state that has a land border with the UK, and Sky News’ coverage of relations 
between the two countries focused heavily on sensational news regarding the 
implications of a Brexit for the Northern Ireland Peace process, claiming, “The 
armoured police checkpoints and customs posts are long gone but Ireland has been 
exploring the cost of having to re-instate at least some controls.” (Blevins, 2016).  The 
sport coverage was primarily centered around David Beckham’s announcement that he 
was voting to remain within the EU.  This led to increased coverage of various sports 
celebrities announcing which camp they supported, and some light debate regarding the 
impact of the free movement of people on the development and quality of sport within 
the UK. 
 RT UK’s agenda included six additional issues that made up at least 1% of all 
reporting: racism, British-Irish relations, Nazism, Turkish EU membership, workers’ 
rights, and influence.  Additionally, the issue of uncertainty, which was in the core of 
the BBC and Sky News’ agenda, was absent from RT UK’s, with an issue salience 
score of only 0.007.  The coverage of British-Irish relations followed much the same 
theme as the coverage in Sky News, with sensationalized accounts of the potential 
breakdown of the Northern Ireland peace process, and the possibility of Irish 
reunification.  The issues of racism and Nazism appeared towards the end of the 
campaign and were covered by all three media organizations.  UK Independence Party 
leader Nigel Farage actively campaigned against immigration, which led some in the 
remain camp to accuse his rhetoric of including racist overtones, particularly following 
the rollout of a poster entitled “Breaking Point” that featured a group of Syrian refugees 
entering Slovenia.  RT UK reported, “The billboard has also come under criticism for its 
striking similarity to a 1941 Nazi newsreel showing a long line of Jewish refugees on a 
forced march.” (RT, 2016).  Workers’ rights coverage focused on Labour party leader 
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Jeremy Corbyn’s campaign to remain, which relied on the claim that British workers 
would be better protected by remaining in the EU.  The issue of Turkey’s membership 
in the EU was raised by the leave camp late in the campaign to emphasize the threat of 
increasing numbers of EU labor migrants entering the UK.  The issue of British 
influence was raised by both camps, remain claiming that Britain’s global influence was 
amplified by remaining a member of the EU, and leave claiming that Britain’s voice 
would be stronger out.  All of these issues that are present in RT UK’s agenda are also 
present in the other two media organizations’ reporting, albeit in much lower 
proportions.  With only 71 published stories over the entire period of analysis, this is 
likely a product of RT UK’s overall lower coverage of the Brexit campaign, than an 
emphasis by RT UK.   
 From these results, hypothesis one was proved correct.  BBC’s overall agenda 
consisted of 16 separate issues, Sky News’ agenda consisted of 13 separate agendas, 
and RT UK’s agenda consisted of 15 separate agendas.  The difference between the 
BBC and Sky News is marked but expected from the literature regarding public service 
media and commercial media.  While the core 10 issues overlapped between the two 
organizations, the content which differed is significant, with BBC’s unique agenda 
focusing on policy implications, while Sky News focused on sensational stories and 
sport.  RT UK’s agenda, while consisting of fewer issues than BBC’s, was less 
statistically significant.  Those issues unique to RT UK were likely emphasized by the 
relative dearth of reporting on the common issues.   
 Hypothesis two has mixed results.  The difference between the BBC and Sky 
News is evident.  Sky News placed considerable emphasis on economy and horserace 
coverage, with issue salience scores of 0.222 and 0.214, respectively, then exhibited a 
precipitous drop of 0.100 in issue salience in the next issue.  The BBC also placed the 
most salience on the economy and horserace coverage; these scores were lower than 
those of Sky News at 0.181 and 0.153, respectively.  Additionally, the shift in issue 
salience towards the next issue was half of that of Sky News at 0.050.  RT UK’s agenda 
building was not consistent with hypothesis two, as the levels of issue salience were 
similar to those of the BBC.  RT UK also had the most emphasis on the issues of 
horserace and the economy with issue salience scores of 0.185 and 0.136, respectively, 
and the difference between these and the following issue is 0.016, much lower than 
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either of the other two organizations.  So, regarding hypothesis two, Sky News’ agenda 
construction heavily favored two issues, which together comprised nearly half of all Sky 
News’ Brexit coverage, while BBC and RT UK presented more even coverage on 
additional issues. 
 Regarding agenda building, there appears to be some evidence that funding 
model has an influence, though that influence is moderated by other factors.  The 
majority of the media agenda presented by all three organizations comprised of the 
same core issues, leading me to conclude that agenda building is likely more heavily 
influenced by variables elsewhere in the Hierarchy of Influences model.  However, the 
instances where the agendas do diverge between the three organizations show strong 
preference for the funding model of the given organization.  For example, RT UK’s 
highlighting of US-UK relations, as well as the relative diminished focus on coalition 
building, demonstrate a clear interest in coverage that corresponds with Russian national 
interests. 
Frame Building 
 There is considerable variety in how the assorted media organizations represent 
the issues present in their agendas.  From my results, there is no readily discernable 
pattern or commonality in the framing of the issues, with the highest Pearson’s r value 
of 0.65 between Sky News and the BBC, and the lowest 0.14 between Sky News and 
RT UK.  In this regard, organizational variables appear to have considerable influence 
on how issues are framed. 
 In Sky News’ coverage of the Brexit debate, issues ranged from a maximum 
attribute salience score of 0.22 for sport to a minimum score of -0.47 for second 
referendum.  Sport coverage consisted primarily of British sporting celebrities 
supporting one side of the referendum or the other, often attempting to explain how 
their position benefitted sport in the UK.  Sky News focused primarily on the 
celebrities, without much substance on the debate regarding sport in the UK.  Besides 
sport, Sky News only had three additional issues with positive attribute salience scores: 
security, conservative party leadership, and healthcare.  The remaining 18 issues with 
sufficient coverage to determine reliable attribute salience scores all trended negative, 
with uncertainty and second referendum coverage possessing the most negative 
attribution.  Sky News often repeated the rhetoric from the remain campaign that 
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leaving was a “leap in the dark” and a risk to British voters, with little coverage of the 
leave camp’s assurances to the contrary.  Regarding a potential second referendum, Sky 
News published stories such as, “Cameron Rules Out Second EU Referendum” and 
“Barroso: Second EU Referendum 'unthinkable'” which repeated the assurance of the 
impossibility of a second referendum by both sides.  This predominately negative 
coverage aligns with existing literature regarding the prevalence of negative coverage 
by commercial media producers to draw audiences. 
 The BBC had much more neutral coverage, with nearly all issues falling 
between -0.29 and 0.14, with the exception of a single outlier: influence.  British 
influence was covered positively with an attribute salience score of 0.50.  I believe that 
this may be due to the BBC’s position as the British national broadcaster, which is itself 
a tool for the UK’s global influence, and therefore whose organizational variables could 
have prompted the organization to only cover positive attributes of British influence in 
the world. Excluding this outlier, BBC’s coverage remains mostly neutral, trending 
slightly negative, without a wide spread of emotive connotations.  These results further 
fit with the literature regarding public service broadcasters producing coverage that is 
neutral and balanced. 
 RT UK’s framing of issues was universally negative, with attribute salience 
scores ranging from -.13 to -.80.  The least negative issue was that of coalition building, 
while the most negative was that of US-UK relations.  The prodigiously negative 
coverage portrays Obama’s statements as violating Britain’s sovereignty, as evidenced 
by “Obama should look at American history before intervening in British politics” (RT, 
2016a) and “described Obama’s intervention as ‘misguided’ and argued that the United 
States must respect the sovereignty of other nations.” (RT, 2016c).  This reiterates the 
findings in the agenda building section wherein RT UK’s content echoes Russian state 
positions with conspicuous anti-Americanism (Shiraev, & Zubok, 2000), as well as a 
high valuation on sovereignty (Ziegler, 2012).  Additionally, the low absolute values in 
attribute salience scores suggest that due to its funding structure, RT UK is not subject 
to the same organizational constraints that the other organizations are.  The guaranteed 
funding stream allows RT UK to frame issues considerably more negative than Sky 
News, which would be concerned with scaring off potential customers (Kleemans, 
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Heniks-Vettehen, Beentjes, & Eisinga, 2012), or the BBC, which risks alienating license 
fee payers.   
 The issue of security ranged from and attribute salience score of -.22 from RT 
UK, .07 from the BBC, and .13 by Sky News.  The range of scores points to significant 
influence from organizational variables.  The BBC’s score is the result of balanced 
coverage, explaining the risks and benefits presented for both leaving and remaining in 
the EU.  Sky News’ coverage, only focused on those statements readily available which 
promoted the benefits and highlighted the importance of the UK’s continued 
membership in the EU, without offering any alternative views.  RT UK’s considerably 
negative score is due to coverage that disparaged NATO and attempts at European 
security cooperation.   
 The differences in overall tone is evident in figure 5, p 50.  Excluding the 
outlier, influence in BBC’s coverage, Sky News’ has the greatest overall diversity in 
attribute salience over a range of 0.69, followed by RT UK with a total difference of 
0.67.  BBC maintains a much more consistent tone, only ranging 0.43.  This validates 
hypothesis three.  While I expected to see some positive reporting from RT UK, the 
total range of negative attribution was much greater than that of BBC.  This finding 
confirms existing views of public service broadcasters producing content that is 
balanced.   
 Hypothesis four was mostly disproved.  The BBC did produce the most neutral 
content, with a mean total attribute salience score of -.08.  While Sky News did produce 
a majority of negative content, with a mean total attribute salience score of -.20, it was 
not as negative as RT UK’s coverage at -.44.  Kleemans, Heniks Vettehen, Beentjes, 
and Eisinga (2012) have demonstrated that certain demographics prefer neutral content 
to negative content, and therefore profit maximizing behaviors could potentially limit 
the amount of negative content presented in Sky News’ coverage.  RT UK as an 
organization not driven by profit maximization does not have the same restrictions and 
therefore was able to produce much more negative content.  This does not address the 
portion of hypothesis four addressing the polarity of RT UK’s coverage, which must be 
rejected as there was not a single issue framed positively by the organization.   
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Potential Issues 
When considering potential issues with my research, the first problem that 
comes to mind is confirmation bias.  Since I alone developed the hypotheses and 
collected all of the data, my results may have been affected.  The qualitative judgement 
regarding attribute salience is particularly vulnerable to this issue.  In an ideal version of 
this experiment a separate researcher, with no prior knowledge of the hypotheses would 
have collected the data to negate this potential effect.  Though I was aware of this 
potential problem and was sure to remain as critical as possible, and recorded all the 
emotive language which I used to make my determinations as an extra justification. 
 Preferably, this research would have included all of the Brexit coverage from all 
three media organizations throughout the entirety of the debate.  Unfortunately, that 
level of analysis was not possible given the limited scope of this project.  This was 
overcome by selecting three distinct period throughout the campaign.  While this mostly 
remedied concerns, the results would have benefitted from including a larger sample 
size.   
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Conclusion 
 The media’s influence on public opinion surrounding political communications 
remains an important issue.  Electorate engagement with information delivered from the 
media can assist facilitation of meaningful political debate.  The advent of the internet 
has allowed for an increased variety of voices to enter the media landscape, and while 
many welcome this change as increasing pluralism and giving a voice to previously 
unheard minorities, others decry organizations as “fake news” or propaganda.  With 
more and more states investing in expeditionary media organizations, with claimed 
editorial independence, the issue of objectivity arises.  Therefore, understanding what 
causes various media organizations to produce the content that they do, is important for 
regulators trying to balance press freedoms with the threats of hostile narratives.  As 
such I set out to answer the research question: “Do different funding models influence 
agenda building and frame building in different news organizations?”  
 To answer this question, I selected the 2016 campaign for the British referendum 
on EU membership, due to the diversity of issues included in the debate and nature of 
referendum campaigns.  Throughout three distinct weeks in the campaign, February 21-
27, April 17-23, and June 19-25, a single coder analyzed all reporting from the native 
websites of three distinct British media organizations: the BBC, Sky News, and RT UK.  
This content was coded by issue to determine which issues were prominently reported 
throughout each selected period of analysis by each organization.  Additionally, each 
instance of a given issue being reported was assigned an emotive score between -1 and 
1 to determine how each issue was reported by each organization.  This data was then 
statistically analyzed to determine how the Brexit agenda was constructed by each 
organization, that is to say, which issues were most prominently featured in the 
reporting, and how each issue was framed by the various organizations, or how the 
issues were described.   
 Utilizing this data, I was able to bring some clarity to my research question.  
Regarding agenda building, there were both important differences as well as key 
similarities between the agendas constructed by the three media organizations.  For all 
three organizations, the bulk of their agenda consisted of the same eight core issues: 
economy, horserace, coalition building, migration, sovereignty, EU reform, trade, and 
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security.  For all three organizations, these eight issues comprised at least 68% of all 
Brexit campaign coverage.  In addition, these eight core issues were presented in similar 
orders of issue salience.   
 Outside of these eight core issues, the remaining issues highlighted by each 
organization do point to funding influences.  The remainder of Sky News’ agenda 
consists of few issues, and these issues are generally more superficial and entertainment 
focused.  The remainder of the BBC’s agenda contains the highest number of additional 
issues, which are generally more informative and policy oriented.  RT UK’s remaining 
agenda focused heavily on US-UK relations, an issue that is of concern to the Russian 
state, who funds RT UK. 
 This research, therefore, has shown that while organizational variables can 
influence agenda building, this influence appears to be limited. This is best exemplified 
through RT UK’s launch announcement, which stated, “RT UK will provide a 
welcomed media presence in Britain, covering issues that have formerly remained 
beyond the media spotlight of the nation.” (RT, 2014).  Despite this, the bulk of RT 
UK’s agenda surrounding the Brexit campaign consisted of issues that were also 
prominent in the other organizations.  It is likely that higher order variables, such as 
those at the institutional level are more important in driving agenda construction.  The 
similarities in agenda constructions point to “the media” as an institution as being more 
heavily influenced by other institutions regarding what issues get reported, rather than 
by internal organizational variables. 
 However, when it comes to frame building, this research suggests that the media 
organization does have considerable influence.  This study was unable to determine any 
common patterns of attribute salience between the three organizations, as every issue 
was uniquely described by each media organization.  The BBC, was shown to deliver 
content which predominantly neutrally frames issues, with a narrow range of emotive 
descriptions, keeping with its public service mandate and public funding model.  Sky 
News framed issues largely negatively, in line with the literature regarding the profit 
maximization behavior of corporately funded media organizations.  RT UK, unique 
among the three analyzed organizations produced content wherein issues were 
universally negatively framed, with a particularly negative framing of the US-UK 
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relations and Nazism.  This was tied to anti-Americanism and anti-fascism, two issues 
that feature prominently in Russian political discourse (Umland, 2012). 
 These findings contribute to the existing literature on the organizational 
variables level of Shoemaker, and Reese’s hierarchy of influences model (2014).  The 
results agree with prior studies such as Newton’s 2016 summary that public service 
broadcasters produce content that is more politically neutral, and consists of more 
“hard” news, while commercial broadcasters produce content that contains more bias 
and a larger amount of “soft” news.   Additional political communications studies have 
concluded that public service news producers create content that is strictly in line with 
professional journalistic practices of neutralness, while commercial producers produce 
content which is more entertaining (Roca-Cuberes, 2014).  This study further confirms 
these findings, as the BBC constructed an agenda that included considerably more 
practical considerations for British voters and framed these issues neutrally, while Sky 
News constructed an agenda with higher salience placed upon “soft” issues such as 
sports and celebrities, and framed these issues more negatively. 
 In addition, this study has explored the idea of where the new expeditionary 
media organizations might fit in our understanding of media organizations.  RT UK 
used the greatest range of emotive language in its coverage, although that tone was 
universally negative.  RT UK’s coverage was by far the most negative, demonstrating 
that it is not subject to the same organizational constraints that Sky News and the BBC 
are.  Despite claims of editorial independence, and operations within the UK, RT UK 
still developed content that mirrors views and opinions presented by the Russian 
government.   
 This research could be beneficial to those bodies that regulate and legislate 
media policy.  The balance of promoting a pluralist media environment, while providing 
quality information has been approached from various angles.  While some states, such 
as Canada and Greece heavily regulate the foreign ownership of media, others, such as 
Ireland, Germany, and The Netherlands have completely deregulated foreign ownership 
(Collins, 2003).  However, this research demonstrates that ownership alone does not tell 
the complete story. Expeditionary media organizations offer yet another model of media 
ownership, that regulators need to deal with.  RT UK’s coverage of the Brexit campaign 
demonstrates this.  The agenda constructed by this organization appears to have been 
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influenced by the same higher order influences that also influenced the traditional media 
organizations.  Despite this, the ways which those issues were framed fell very much in 
line with the interests of the Russian state.  RT UK’s framing did not mirror either the 
model public service broadcaster, the BBC, nor the commercial broadcaster, Sky News.  
Therefore, media regulators would benefit from considering the funding model of media 
organizations in addition to ownership. 
 This research also contributes to those voices that promote the merits of 
maintaining public service media organizations.  When public revenues rapidly declined 
following the 2008 economic crisis, in addition to the increasing availability of 
information freely accessible on the internet, many governments questioned the value of 
maintaining state funded public service broadcasters (Mitu, 2015; Njegovan, & Sidanin, 
2014).  This research finds that public service news production still offers an important 
service to democratic societies.  The neutral and balanced coverage of the BBC 
consisted of more detailed policy issues, which would be beneficial to political debate.  
Therefore, these findings support those who promote the value offered by public service 
media organizations such as Newton (2016). 
 RT UK is perhaps an outlier in the world of expeditionary media outlets in the 
UK’s media system, due to the existing strain on British-Russian relations (Financial 
Times, 2017).  Of specific concern is the belief from the Russian side that they are 
currently engaging in an “information war” with the West (Samadashvili, 2015).  
Therefore, further research should be undertaken to understand how agenda building 
and frame building is conducted by expeditionary media organizations from other 
countries, and whether any observable patterns exist.   
 Another question regarding expeditionary media arises from the findings of RT 
UK’s agenda construction.  Since the majority of issue salience in RT UK’s coverage 
aligned with the coverage in the traditional media organizations, there appears to be 
some amount of British influence on RT UK’s agenda construction.  Therefore, it would 
be interesting to discover how similar the content of expeditionary media organizations 
matches the content of media produced in the organization’s home country.    
 A final avenue for future research regarding expeditionary media organizations 
would be to determine whether and how they construct agendas and frames in different 
markets.  For example, Al Jazeera has a global spread of organizations including Al 
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Jazeera Balkans, headquartered in Sarajevo; Al Jazeera Türk, headquartered in Istanbul; 
and formerly Al Jazeera America, in New York City.  Likewise, in addition to RT UK, 
the RT network includes RT America, based in Washington, D.C.; RT Français, based 
in Paris; and RT Deutsch, headquartered in Berlin.  By comparing the content produced 
in these varied markets, one could potentially better understand how influential funding 
model is to content production, as opposed to institutional and social system variables. 
 Recent concerns spurred by “fake news”, information warfare, and “alternative 
facts,” are well founded given the power of the media to influence public opinion and 
political agendas as demonstrated through the theories of agenda setting and framing.  
Therefore, it behooves those interested in the democratic process to understand what 
influences the media to produce the content which they do.  In developing their 
hierarchy of influences theory Shoemaker and Reese were clear that no single level of 
influences existed in a vacuum, and that all levels are in some way responsible for the 
media content that is ultimately consumed by the public.  This research helps to 
understand how organization funding models play a role in the construction of media 
agendas and frames.  Just as Shoemaker and Reese proposed, my findings conclude that 
organizational funding does not single handedly drive content creation, but it does play 
a role, and should be considered when legislating, regulating, or even discussing media.   
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Appendix 1: Coding Frame 
 
Agriculture Far Right Putin 
British Identity Federal Europe Racism 
British-French Relations Fisheries Religion 
British-Irish Relations Future Generations Research 
Class Division Germany Russia 
Coalition Building Gibraltar Science 
Conservative Party Leadership Health Scottish Independence 
Corporate Control Horserace Second Referendum 
Economy Influence Security 
Education Irish Reunification Sovereignty 
Environment Irrevocability Sport 
EU Collapse London Independence Swedish-UK Relations 
EU Expansion Mechanics of Leaving Trade 
EU Foreign Policy Migration Transport 
EU Funds Nationalism Turkish EU Membership 
EU Privacy Law NATO UK Rebate 
EU Reform Nazism Uncertainty 
EU Regulation Negotiations US-French Relations 
European Citizenship Neoliberalism US-UK Relations 
European Values NI Peace Process Voter Engagement 
EU-Russia Relations Northern Ireland Wales 
EU-US Relations Populism Women's Rights 
Extremism Privacy Workers' Rights 
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